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Daily Report
East Europe

FBIS-EEU-96-021

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Albania: Turkey Signs Technical Cooperation Protocol

AU3101115996 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] A technical cooperation protocol was signed today between the Governments of the Republic of Turkey and Albania. For the Turkish side, the protocol was signed by Mr. (Umut Arik), president of the Turkish Agency of International Cooperation at the Turkish Foreign Ministry, and for the Albanian side, by Edmond Leka, director of the Department of Economic Development and Coordination of Foreign Aid at the Council of Ministers.

By signing this protocol, the Governments of the Republic of Albania and Turkey agree to increase the economic and social cooperation between the two countries. The Turkish Government will ensure technical assistance and training in concrete projects by cooperating with public and private organizations.

During the talks today, both parties discussed concrete cooperation projects in various fields such as the construction of roads, the exchange of information on the restructuring of enterprises, the exchange of experience in agriculture, technical assistance in preventing the massive movement of the population, and assistance in raising the level of our journalists through qualification courses.

Albania: Probe Ordered Into Serb Funding of PS

AU2901182696 Paris AFP in English 1757 GMT 29 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Tirana, Jan 29 (AFP)—Albania's parliament ordered an investigation Monday into claims that Serbia financed the country's main opposition party and hoped to restore communists to power.

The move came after press reports quoting a former Albanian secret policeman as saying Belgrade paid "significant amounts of money" to the Socialist Party "to support the return of communists to power."

Belgrade had acted "under order from Russian communists," he added, saying the independent KOHA JONE newspaper was similarly financed.

The Socialist Party, which joined KOHA JONE in denying the allegations as electioneering, was the ruling party during Albania's Stalinist era which ended in 1991.

The ruling Democratic Party of President Sali Berisha called on the authorities and intelligence services last week to check out the accusations.

Albania is due to hold legislative elections in spring.

Stanimir Vukicevic, charge d'affairs at the federal Yugoslav embassy in Tirana, also dismissed the claims as "totally false."

Albania: Press Warns of Berisha's 'Thirst for Power'

AU3101102996 Tirana ZERI I POPULLIT in Albanian 28 Jan 96 p 1

[Article by Luan Rama: "Traps..."]

[FBIS Translated Text] During the last few days, the Democratic Party's [PD] version of the Electoral Law has reached the parliament (although parliament remains on its long winter recess, apparently to make up for its hectic activities in the closing days of last year). As expected, President Berisha failed to keep his word given publicly at the roundtable organized by 13 political parties. Propaganda toffees melt very quickly, and we are now savoring the bitter aftertaste of presidential demagogy. This is because the draft Electoral Law differs greatly from the present law, because it is pervaded by the Stalinism of the thirties, because it violates the fundamental principles of democracy, and because it conflicts with European concepts of a law-governed state. Sali Berisha has not surrendered his failed ideas from the period before the referendum of 6 November 1994, despite the lesson he was taught: What he then failed to achieve, thanks to the votes of the entire people and their determination to preserve these votes, he is now trying to gain through the bill he has now served up for the upcoming elections. For this purpose, he has used all means, every kind of machination, and the entire state apparatus. It is no coincidence that, when the representatives of the 13 political parties gathered to discuss the electoral bill, the PD representatives came to the meeting without their own draft, which they had sent to the empty parliament for the chairs to read. Nor was the police control and sequestration of the vans of KOHA JONE's press distribution agency a coincidence. Everything has been diabolically contrived and carried out. It was all an exquisitely devised trap, which, unfortunately for the Council of Europe representatives, did not hold together for long.

Knowing that the public at home and abroad are very sensitive to police violence and assaults on the free press, they played this card to attract attention, but forgot that any fool knows democracy in Albania is not being jeopardized by the attempts of Kolec Topalli and Tritan Shehu to convert KOHA JONE to the side of the PD. Now, it is endangered by something much bigger, and that is the tribal-chief mentality that prevails in the PD and Sali Berisha's limitless "thirst for power."

We must not underestimate or forget this for a single instant. The Albanians have shown more than once that they know how to overcome the totalitarian impositions of chieftains [bajraktare]. They have also shown more than once that they know how to triumph over Sali Berisha and to compel him to admit defeat. The state's propaganda machine will go through its motions. We will face slander and other traps. There will be threats and accusations, but these are as nothing in front of the entire people, and have no value when up against their determination to defend democracy from violation and outrage. People, now more than ever, be vigilant for your own good and the good of all, including that of Sali Berisha and the PD, for the good of Albania, and for the progress of democracy.

Albania: PD's Mece: Gjinushi Was Spy in Residence

AU3101103096 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 30 Jan 96 p 3

[Unattributed report: "Gjinushi Spy in Residence During His Stay in France"]

[FBIS Translated Text] At yesterday's plenary session of parliament, Democratic Party [PD] deputy Arben Mece informed his colleagues that Skender Gjinushi was a spy in residence during the time he studied in France. Mece said that he was able to support this statement with the help of people on whom Gjinushi had spied. A pale Gjinushi reacted with loutish behavior. Mece then told Gjinushi that he had also hidden himself in the lavatories of politics. The Social Democrat leader [Gjinushi] was obliged to leave the chamber, but this did not help him very much, because Mece saw fit to repeat, in the courtyard in front of the building, that Gjinushi had been a spy in residence. Deputies and journalists present at the time expected Mece to say more, but he saw fit not to tell all yesterday.

Albania: National Unity Party Leader Arrested

AU3001180296 Tirana KOHA JONE in Albanian 30 Jan 96 p 2

[Report by "A.P.": "Idajet Beqiri in Handcuffs"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Tirana—Another person on the list of the Forum of Intellectuals for the Punishment of Genocide has been put in handcuffs over his role in internments. Mr. Idajet Beqiri, leader of the National Unity Party, was detained on Sunday [28 January] evening, following an order of the Tirana procurator authorized by the court. This brings the number of persons detained under this law to 31. A court session confirming the arrest of the most recent detainees is expected to be held in the Tirana court today. Procurator Shkelqim Gani signed Mr. Beqiri's detention order. According to Tirana Chief Procurator Adnan Xhelili, Beqiri, "as a member of the Internment and Exile Committee in Kruje District in the eighties, is accused of unjustly authorizing the internment of several families for political reasons, in contravention of the laws in force." As in the cases of other senior officials of the previous regime, the charges against Beqiri are under the Antigenocide Law, and involve internments carried out in contravention of the two constitutions of that time and international conventions to which Albania was a signatory. This is not the first time that Beqiri has been charged and prosecuted. During the time of the dictatorship, he was convicted of abuse of office, and last December he was detained at a police station for 48 hours following a quarrel with the proprietor of the ZERI I POPULLIT printing works. Procurator Gani told Beqiri that charges over this incident had been dropped only at the beginning of last week, only to inform him of the charges under the Antigenocide Law one week later.

Bulgaria: Assembly Votes in Favor of NATO Membership

AU3101165796 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1600 GMT 31 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] With 14 votes for, 12 against, and one abstention, the National Assembly Foreign Affairs Commission issued a positive opinion on the draft decision on Bulgaria's full-fledged membership of NATO.

National Assembly Chairman Blagovest Sendov briefed the Commission's members on his talks with Russian President Boris Yeltsin.

Bulgaria: Opposition Demands Sendov Resignation

AU3101120196 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1000 GMT 31 Jan 96

[Report by Valya Manolova from National Assembly in Sofia — live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today's plenary session of the National Assembly began in an extremely unusual manner. Deputy Asen Agov read the protest declaration — the contents of which have already been made public — issued by the parliamentary groups of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS], People's Union, the Rights and Freedoms Movement [DPS], and independent deputies representing New Democracy and the Bulgarian Business Bloc. The declaration protests against the conduct of National Assembly Chairman Blagovest Sendov in Moscow. According to ITAR-TASS, at his meeting with President Yeltsin, Sendov stated the firm position that NATO should not expand to the east. The protest declaration reaches the conclusion that such a person cannot hold the second most important state post.

As our listeners know, we had to leave our parliamentary studio for about 20 minutes while the deputies held consultations behind closed doors on whether they should call a closed session to hear a report from Sendov on what exactly he said in Moscow. The deputies reached a compromise solution, namely that Sendov should report in a closed session, but only to the Parliamentary Assembly Foreign Policy Commission. According to Zlatina Georgieva, the commission has been in closed session for two hours already. Mr. Sendov came out of the session briefly, but refused to make any statement. The SDS deputies are unequivocal in their resolve to demand Sendov's resignation even if he continues to deny the reports on what he said in Moscow. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: SDS Faction Demands Sendov Resignation

AU3001183596 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1700 GMT 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] On 30 January the parliamentary faction of the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] adopted a declaration that describes as scandalous and anticonstitutional the statements against the expansion of NATO made by National Assembly Chairman Sendov in Moscow.

The SDS calls upon Mr. Sendov to resign immediately.

If Mr. Sendov does not resign, the SDS will officially demand his resignation as National Assembly chairman, the SDS declaration reads.

Bulgaria: Pirinski Views Foreign Policy Differences

AU3001180496 Sofia DUMA in Bulgarian 26 Jan 96 pp 7-8

[Interview with Foreign Minister Georgi Pirinski by Konstantin Ivanov; place and date not given: "Synchronization of Action is an Important Factor for Effectiveness in Foreign Policy"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Passage omitted] [Ivanov] In his last statement, the president roundly criticized foreign policy activity on two points: first, the vagueness surrounding our application to join NATO, and second, the shift of accent in Balkan policy.

[Pirinski] It is true that such criticism was made, but I consider it absolutely unfounded.

First, regarding relations between Bulgaria and NATO our position is quite clear. We view our relations with NATO in the context of Bulgaria's national security interests and the need to seek partners and accords that guarantee the foreign conditions for our national security. These guarantees are along the lines of our integration with the EU, including on questions of foreign policy and common approaches toward security, partnership with the Western European Union, and cooperation with NATO, while maintaining an active dialogue on the forms of cooperation with the alliance and continuing active participation in the Partnership for Peace program.

On the second subject of the president's critical comments — the shift in accents — mathematical synchronization of actions in time, the simultaneous development of relations with each of our neighbors, is quite impossible, and anyway does not depend on Bulgaria alone. In all our bilateral contacts during 1995, we declared quite clearly that we want to develop good-neighborly and most active relations of cooperation with all our partners in the Balkans. In the bilateral contacts that we implemented, we corroborated these intentions of ours in protocols with similar contents.

I will permit myself to comment that the impression of a shift in accent partly arises as a result of the dissimilar coverage of the various contacts. In this context, I hope that the contacts in 1996 will be reported sufficiently fully and objectively, so to prevent even an optical illusion of a shift of accent that may lead even responsible state institutions to claim that this has occurred.

[Ivanov] Let us put the question differently. In your opinion, has our foreign policy activity been sufficiently effective and productive?

[Pirinski] There are two aspects to your question. The first is the activity of the government itself. We should not forget that Bulgaria's foreign policy activity does not wholly come within the Council of Ministers's prerogatives. I think that there is room enough for the government and the Foreign Ministry in particular to improve its work in the foreign policy field. However, the chief area, generally speaking, in which we can seek to raise efficiency and productivity is in improving synchronization of action and unity of purpose in the foreign policy activities of the different institutions. I should make it clear that the Constitution clearly and unequivocally entrusts the Council of Ministers with the direction and implementation of the country's foreign policy.

However, I would like it to be clear that we do not consider that the government holds some kind of monopoly. The Constitution and the laws also give important powers regarding foreign policy to the parliament and the president of the Republic. The whole question lies in how the Constitution is interpreted and applied. In my view, there is absolutely no foundation in the interpretation that leads to the conclusion that everyone is free to carry out his own foreign policy programs. This idea is frivolous, counterproductive, and to a large extent impairs the effectiveness of a country's foreign policy.

[Ivanov] What in your opinion should be done to improve this synchronization in 1996?

[Pirinski] In general terms, two things. The first is a duty of the government. It seems to me that at the start of the year we in the government and the Foreign Ministry should declare our views on the contacts that it would be useful for the other state institutions to establish in conformance with the country's foreign policy priorities as formulated by the government. At the same time, the other institutions that influence our foreign policy activity should announce their intentions at an early stage, to enable the government to set up the necessary organization and authorize its representatives to take part in the various visits and sign specific treaties with the Council of Ministers' authorization as appropriate.

You realize that I am talking about certain inconsistencies, which have appeared and become public knowledge, between the president's visits and the government's readiness to arrange for its representatives to take part in such visits. It is unsound, unsatisfactory, not to say bizarre, for a message to arrive from the president's office only ten days or so before a visit stating that such a visit is being prepared and that it would be nice if such- and-such a minister or deputy prime minister could accompany the president and sign a few agreements. Such an approach is simply unsound. It cannot produce any decent result. I will not mention the scandalous incident last year, when a few presidents of Balkan countries signed the declaration on the East-West corridor in New York. This declaration was prepared without any contact with the Foreign Ministry and without any advance coordination whatsoever with the government. This not only goes beyond the bounds of elementary normal practice, but also contravenes legislative standards.

We may say, this is an incident that will not be repeated. However, this is small consolation, because our task is not to limit the negative aspects, but as far as possible to encourage more responsible and positive practice in this field. [passage omitted]

Bulgaria: SDS Discusses Presidential Nomination Process

AU3001180196 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The parties and organizations in the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS] and the coalition's regional councils must submit their proposals for presidential election candidates by 20 February, the SDS National Coordinating Council decided today.

Individuals who have worked against the SDS may not be proposed, although the candidates must not as a rule be SDS members.

The nominations must be accompanied by the candidate's written consent.

On 27 February all candidacies will be submitted to the SDS National Coordinating Council for assessment.

According to the decision adopted today, the National Coordinating Council can reduce the number of candidacies that will be submitted to the national conference, which will take place at the end of March.

The delegates of the national conference will elect the SDS candidate by secret ballot, and, if necessary, in several rounds.

The National Coordinating Council decided to propose to the other basic opposition forces to nominate a joint candidate for the presidential elections by conducting joint national primaries.

Bulgaria: BSP Working Group on Presidential Elections

AU3001180396 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 1400 GMT 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] Executive Bureau has set up a working group to make preliminary preparations for the upcoming presidential elections. Doncho Konakchiev, Krasimir Premyanov, and Nikolay Dobrev are members. Its task will be to carry out the necessary preliminary and qualitative elaboration of the basic principled issues and organize the BSP's practical actions regarding nominating the candidate of the democratic left.

The BSP Executive Bureau did not discuss the formula for carrying out the presidential elections, or any specific candidacy, Nikolay Dobrev, member of the BSP Executive Bureau told a news conference today.

The work with the township and municipal councillors elected with the BSP ballot, was also discussed at the BSP Executive Bureau meeting.

Bulgaria: Ties Between Videnov, Greek Cabinet Noted

AU3001124696 Sofia SEGA in Bulgarian No. 3, 25-31 Jan 96 p 42

[Article by Mikhaela Zurnas: "Videnov's Man's Man's Man Has Taken Charge in Greece"]

[FBIS Translated Text] However strange it may sound, political life in Sofia and Athens has decided to act in concert. Videnov and Papandreou won their parliamentary votes of confidence on the very same day, but this did not save them from having to shuffle their cabinets. In Greece, this started with the replacement of the prime minister himself, whereas in Bulgaria, to our consolation, only two ministers were replaced.

From his sickbed, Papandreou is waging a struggle with the technocrats in PASOK [Panhellenic Socialist Movement], while the youthful Videnov faces criticisms from the reformers in the BSP [Bulgarian Socialist Party]. However, for a month now both have been losing the ground from under their feet. Papandreou relinquished the prime-ministership, but kept his leadership of the Greek Socialists' party while he recovers. The word about Videnov is different — that he will be deprived of the BSP leadership if he does not survive as prime minister.

Fellow students: The other pure coincidence in the Bulgarian-Greek connection is the election of Kostas [Konstandinos] Simitis as Papandreou's heir in the Greek cabinet. People in Athens believe that Sokratis Kokalis, the owner of the Intracom telecommunications company and of 68 percent of the shares of the notorious Bulphone Company, is behind the new Greek prime minister. In Sofia, it is an open secret that Lyubomir Kolarov, chairman of the Posts and Telecommunications Committee, and Kokalis were fellow students. This means that Simitis and Videnov can strengthen the Bulgarian-Greek connection along the line Intracom-Bulphone-Lyubomir Kolarov-Orion.

Who is Kostas Simitis? The Greeks call him PASOK's "academician" because he studied law in Germany and economics in London. Simitis is a member of Papandreou's old guard and one of the founders of PASOK. He is regarded as a reformer and leader PASOK's pro-European wing. When the Socialists first won power in 1981, he became agriculture minister. Four years later, he was appointed minister of the economy.

Rise and fall: His break with Papandreou dates from 1987, when he was dismissed because of his rigorous taxation policy. Two years later, Simitis returned to power as education minister. In Papandreou's last administration, he has been minister of industry since 1993. His second break with the prime minister occurred as a result of the privatization of the state shipyard. Simitis resigned and declared war on Papandreou. He formed a common front to inject young blood into the party and to remove the prime minister.

Simitis was elected prime minister in the parliamentary vote taken on 18 January in connection with Papandreou's illness. He won by 11 votes in the fight to the death with Interior Minister Akis [Apostolos-Athanasios] Tsokhatzopoulos. Both obtained 53 votes in the second ballot, after the PASOK parliamentary group had rejected the third candidate, Yerasimos Arsenis.

The new Greek prime minister has a year to prove whether he will change from a reformer into PASOK's executioner. His term as prime minister expires next year, but PASOK still has to elect a leader to succeed Papandreou. There, Simitis, the 60-year-old lawyer, will meet his old enemies from the faction led by Interior Minister Akis Tsokhatzopoulos, the wing led by Defense Minister Yerasimos Arsenis, and the "court of Ekali," reigned over by the 40-year-old air hostess

Dhimitra Liani, who has sworn that no other PASOK politician or leader will enter big politics. After Andreas, my life as a woman has closed, Mimi declared at her wedding, but no one believed her. The former prime minister's wife and the dinosaurs surrounding Papandreou are unlikely to come to terms with the loss of the party's leadership. They can forget the affront of Simitis' election only if the new cabinet is a compromise between the two tendencies within PASOK.

Agreed conditions: The first reverberations from Athens indicate that Simitis is retaining Papandreou's ministers. These may be the agreed terms. Akis Tsokhatzopoulos keeps the Interior Ministry, and Yerasimos Arsenis — the Army. Kostas [Konstandinos] Laliotis, who was accused of turning the ballot in Simitis' favor, has also regained his post in the cabinet. Other ministers kept on are National Economy Minister Yiannis Papandoniou and Finance Minister Alexandros Papadhopoulos, the latter under the umbrella of Vaso Papandreou [Mrs. Vasiliki Papandreou]. The former member of the European Parliament and member of Simitis' dissident group heads the superministry of development, trade, energy, and industry, which is considered a key department in Greek cabinets.

The replacement of the foreign minister by another dissident, Theodhoros Pangalos, comes as no surprise either. Karolos Papoulias is one of Papandreou's closest colleagues and a very convenient ally for Dhimitra Liani. He was the only one who admitted in connection with the affair of the villa at Aegali that he had loaned money to the prime minister. The other reason for his replacement is the dissatisfaction of the Greek bankers with the level of Papoulias's diplomatic activity concerning geostrategic projects in the Balkans.

Two other Bulgarian politicians also have links with members of the new Greek cabinet. Pirinski will find it difficult to stomach Pangalos, but he will count on his old friendship with Defense Minister Yerasimos Arsenis. To the general surprise in Bulgaria, Aleksandur Marinov also found his creature in the person of Vaso Papandreou. Even when she was out of favor, the former eurodeputy received a personal invitation from Marinov to attend a seminar on the Western European Union.

Czech Republic: Klaus on Russia's CE Membership

LD3001203296 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 30 Jan 96

[Telephone interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus, in the Austrian Tyrol, by correspondent Ales Hermanek, in Prague; date not given —recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [passage omitted] [Hermanek] Prime Minister, as you know, on 25 January Russia was admitted to the Council of Europe [CE]. Parliament Speaker Milan Uhde described this development as a precocious one. Do you agree? And do you see any connection between Russia's membership in the CE and President Yeltsin's subsequent initiative when he intervened in Germany and the United States against NATO's eastward expansion?

[Klaus] For the moment I would rather leave aside the issue of NATO and NATO's eastward expansion. Let us remember that any Russian politician who would be heard saying: I welcome NATO's expansion to Russia's very border, would spell out the end of his political career at home. Therefore, I can hardly expect that any of them will be heard saying this particular sentence aloud. Frankly, this aspect in itself does not worry me.

Taking the issue of Russia's admission to the CE, well, I think this is a problematic one. But, let's face it, the deed has been done, and now there is little point in making too much of it. The problem is that, on the one hand, there are events taking place in Russia and lately in Chechnya, in particular, which can hardly please anybody or win their approval. On the other hand, it is quite clear that progressive isolation of Russia is no solution, either. What is needed is a dialogue, a process of communication. My position is determined by these two opposing aspects. [passage omitted]

Czech Republic: Havel, Zieleniec Favor Russia in CE

AU3101145496 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 27 Jan 96 p 2

[CTK report: "Havel and Zieleniec Welcome the Admission of Russia Into the Council of Europe"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Prague—President Vaclav Havel and Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec welcome the admission of Russia into the Council of Europe [CE] because they believe that this step will result in Moscow's following the Council's principles. Thus, their stand is contrary to the opinion of the majority of the seven members of the Czech delegation to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council, three of whom voted against the admission and two of whom abstained. They, together with some deputies from other countries, pointed out the fact that Russia does not observe the rules this organization sets for its member states, particularly in the case of Chechnya. Deputy Radim Spacek (Civic Democratic Alliance) even stated that the admission of Russia will result in a loss of the the Council's prestige.

Havel, who recently sharply criticized Moscow precisely because of its approach to Chechnya, believes, on the contrary, that admission will force Russia to at least partially maintain the norms set in all CE conventions. Zieleniec believes that Russia will be at least drawn into the dialogue on the standards it must observe. [illegible] myself, I believe that the admission of Russia to the CE will mean an intensive dialogue between Russia and the other CE members about matters connected with these standards," Zieleniec said.

Czech Republic: Klaus Discusses Local Elections

AU3101093596 Prague DENNI TELEGRAF in Czech 26 Jan 96 p 3

["Regular" interview with Czech Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus by Petr Stiegler in Prague on 25 January: "The Results of the Primaries Do Not Surprise Me All That Much"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Last week was marked by several very excited debates: on the Czech Philharmonic Orchestra, on the fate of the inhabitants of U Sabotu settlement, and on the course of the party primaries. In addition, the Czech Republic took a significant step toward joining the European Union [EU] when it submitted its application. We discussed these events in our regular interview with Prime Minister Vaclav Klaus.

[Stiegler] Prime Minister, during your visit to Italy, you submitted the Czech Republic's official application for EU membership. On this occasion, can you assess how far we have progressed on the way to the EU and what still lies ahead?

[Klaus] Our entire transformation process is preparation for entry into the EU, and the measure of success of the transformation process is also the degree of convergence with the EU. I do not see any fundamental obstacles preventing the Czech Republic from joining the EU. I can only repeat what [Italian] Prime Minister Dini said: The Czech Republic is ready at any time to join the EU.

[Stiegler] At present, the preparation for elections in the individual parties is taking, above all, the form of party primaries. How would you explain some rather surprising results in the Civic Democratic Party [ODS] primaries?

[Klaus] I am not certain whether I should accept the word surprising. If elections are to be elections at all, they cannot consist of results dictated beforehand. They undoubtedly must be something earnest, serious, and truly meaningful. It is true that the defeat of some prominent deputies surprised me, and, if these individuals do not make it into the Chamber, I will consider it a loss. The defeat of other deputies did not surprise me at all, and I believe it good if other people replace them in the Chamber. Therefore I consider a general assessment impossible and believe that it really depends on the voters whom they choose. A four-year term in the Chamber of Deputies in itself does not mean an automatic claim for reelection.

[Stiegler] Nevertheless, it seems that there will be some corrections—Executive Deputy Chairman Libor Novak, for instance....

[Klaus] The primaries on the ward level are just the first step. The constituency or region level follows, and the ODS has precisely defined procedures and routes for the constituency to change the ward ranking. Of course, it is not that simple, but the possibility exists. So, the next step will be the question of how the candidates pass the second round, at the regional level. That is still to come. [passage omitted]

[Stiegler] At its latest session, the government dealt with the problem of drugs, among other things, or rather with the deputies' bill that proposes to render even possession for personal use an offense. What is your opinion on legislative measures in this area? Are you inclined more toward the so-called tough approach or toward the liberal approach?

[Klaus] I would not classify the approach to the problem of drugs by the simple labels harsh or liberal. That is not the question, and the government has not discussed it in any wider context. We dealt exclusively with a specific deputies' bill, and we expressed our disagreement with this bill. Namely, this law would render criminal absolutely anyone—even those people in whose pocket someone put any quantity of drugs, regardless of whether they engaged in the distribution, production, or use of them. Humanity does not deal with its problems in such a simple fashion as has been repeatedly demonstrated by Deputy Severa of the Christian Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party in this bill or in the bill "three times and that's it."

[Stiegler] In the very near future, parliament is to discuss and adopt the constitutional law on the border between the Czech Republic and Slovakia. What consequences would it have if not enough deputies were to raise their hands in favor of it because of the U Sabotu settlement?

[Klaus] The government submitted this bill in all earnest and is convinced that the controversial issues concerning the border with Slovakia must be solved. Of course, it is possible not to adopt anything and leave it for the future. Nevertheless, that would be a bad solution. Therefore, I would recommend that the constitutional law be adopted, and, as I keep saying, the one-sided discussion of this issue in the media bothers me. Everybody acts as if we were giving a piece of our territory to Slovakia but omits mentioning that another piece of territory comes to the Czech Republic. From the vantage point of the territory of the Czech Republic, this move is matched. Nevertheless, our media and some politicians are conducting a debate on the topic of a one-way move with the minus sign. It is impossible to discuss things like that.

Slovakia: Hungarians' Draft Minority Language Law

AU3001131696 Bratislava Draft Minority Language Law in Slovak 22 Dec 95

[Text of the "Hungarian Coalition Bill on the Use of Languages of the National Minorities and Ethnic Groups in the Slovak Republic" dated 22 December 1995; obtained directly from the Hungarian Coalition, which consists of the parties Coexistence, the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement, and the Hungarian Civic Party]

[FBIS Translated Text]

Preamble

The National Council of the Slovak Republic

—recognizing that the languages of national minorities and ethnic groups are an expression of the cultural riches of the country,

—proceeding from support for the languages of the national minorities and ethnic groups with the objective of preserving and developing them, and

—considering the facts that the mother tongue is the most important distinguishing sign of the national minorities and ethnic groups, the most valuable asset of their cultural heritage, and an expression of identity,

—guaranteeing their constitutional rights enshrined in the Constitution of the Slovak Republic [Article 6, Paragraph 2, Article 33 and Article 34 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic] -

has agreed on the following law:

Article 1

The Purpose of the Law and Definition of Terms

1. The law regulates the rights of the national minorities and ethnic groups to use their mother tongue.

2. The Hungarian, Czech, Ukrainian, Ruthenian, Polish, Croat, and German languages are considered languages of a national minority for the purposes of this law.

3. The use of the Romany language is guaranteed by individual provisions of this law.

Article 2

General Provisions

1. The members of the national minorities and ethnic groups have the right to use their mother tongue privately or in public, orally or in writing, freely, and without intervention by the state and its authorities.

2. Persons belonging to the national minorities and ethnic groups have the right to use their surnames [Article 16 of National Council Law 154/1994 of the Code] and names [Article 2, Paragraph 1 of National Council Law 300/1993 of the Code] in their language and the right to official recognition of them.

3. In communities in which the members of a particular national minority or ethnic group makes up at least 10 percent of the population, the name of the community is given also in that mother tongue. Community names, names of city quarters, street names, and other place names designated for the public are given also in that language.

4. Persons belonging to the national minorities and ethnic groups have the right to use their language on shields, signs, and in other information addressed to the public without intervention by the state authorities.

Article 3

Use of the Languages of National Minorities and Ethnic Groups in Official Communication

1. In communities and higher administrative units where members of a particular national minority or ethnic group make up an absolute or relative majority of the population, their mother tongue is an official language of equal standing with the state language for all public administration authorities and public service institutions, the operation of which affects these communities or higher administrative units, and they may execute all their acts bilingually.

2. In communities and higher administrative units where members of a particular national minority or ethnic group make up at least 10 percent of the population, their members have the right to use their mother tongue in dealing with the authorities.

3. In communities and higher administrative units where members of a particular national minority or ethnic group make up at least 10 percent of the total population, the public administration authorities and public service institutions shall provide the citizen with official forms that are also in the language of the national minority or ethnic group or bilingual forms.

4. Members of the national minorities and ethnic groups have the right to make their submissions, oral or written, to the public administration authorities and public service institutions and receive the answer in their mother tongue.

5. In communities and higher administrative units where members of a particular national minority or ethnic

group make up at least 10 percent of the total population, the public administration authorities and public service institutions shall publish all legislative regulations, instructions, resolutions, and other official documents in the language of the national minority or ethnic group in addition to the Slovak language.

6. To guarantee the rights enshrined in this resolution, a condition for employment or similar engagement in certain positions and one of the conditions for executing an agreed job in any given function in state offices or organizations, bodies of local administration, and public service institutions in communities and higher administrative units where members of a particular national minority or ethnic group make up at least 10 percent of the total population is a functioning knowledge of the language of the national minority or ethnic group used in that particular community or higher administrative unit. This requirement is not considered an act of discrimination against other citizens of the Slovak Republic.

7. Any information from the state authorities, state organizations, bodies of local administration, and public service institutions, transport and communication authorities, and the police and fire-fighting service addressed to the public in communities where members of a particular national minority or ethnic group make up at least 10 percent of the total population is published also in the language of that national minority or ethnic group.

8. Community chronicles may be kept also in the language of the national minority or ethnic group [Article 4, Paragraph 3, Subparagraph a) of Law-369/1990 of the Code on Local Administration regarding the text of earlier regulations].

Article 4

Use of the Languages of National Minorities and Ethnic Groups in Court and Administrative Dealings

1. The members of the national minorities and ethnic groups have the right to use their mother tongue in court and administrative dealings.

2. In the communities and higher administrative units where members of a particular national minority or ethnic group make up at least 10 percent of the total population,

a) during criminal proceedings, on the basis of a request by the accused, they have the right to have the trial conducted in the language of the national minority or ethnic group

b) during civil proceedings, on the basis of a joint request by the parties, they have the right to have the trial conducted in their mother tongue

c) in dealings with administration authorities, Article 3, Paragraph 1 of this law applies

d) they have the right to submit petitions and evidence in writing or orally in their mother tongue.

Article 5

Use of the Languages of National Minorities and Ethnic Groups in Education

1. The members of the national minorities and ethnic groups have the right to be educated in their language at all levels of education.

2. In schools where the language of instruction is the language of a national minority or an ethnic group, the language of instruction and examination is the language of that particular minority. This provision does not affect the compulsory teaching of the state language in all elementary and high schools in the Slovak Republic.

3. In schools where the language of instruction is the language of a national minority or an ethnic group, all educational business is conducted in the language of instruction. The reports issued by these schools shall be bilingual.

4. The Education Ministry will provide textbooks and teaching material for these schools in the language of instruction. Schools where the language of instruction is the language of a national minority or ethnic group may use textbooks issued in the school language of instruction that have been obtained through international cooperation.

5. In addition to schools where the language of instruction is the language of the national minorities and ethnic groups, the Slovak Republic will arrange for instruction of the languages of the national minorities and ethnic groups and the Romany language in other schools, as required by the parents or other natural persons, and will provide the necessary textbooks.

Article 6

Use of the Languages of National Minorities and Ethnic Groups in Culture

1. The members of the national minorities and ethnic groups have the right to maintain their cultural heritage, develop it, and pass it on to future generations.

2. To maintain their cultural identity, the members of the national minorities and ethnic groups have the right to found organizations, associations, and institutions.

Their language of operation is the language of the relevant national minority or ethnic group. Their internal agenda is conducted in the language of that particular national minority or ethnic group. In the spirit of Paragraphs 1 and 2 of this provision, the members of the national minorities and ethnic groups have the right to support for their activities in the form of an appropriate contribution from the state budget and public funds. The amount of the contribution is based on their relative representation in society.

Article 7

Use of the Languages of National Minorities and Ethnic Groups in the Media

1. The members of the national minorities and ethnic groups have the right to express their opinions and receive and release information in their mother tongue without intervention by the state authorities and regardless of the border.

2. The members of the national minorities and ethnic groups must not be exposed to discrimination in their approach to media on the basis of their being a part of a national minority or an ethnic group.

3. The members of the national minorities and ethnic groups have the right to establish and use their media using their mother tongue.

4. The members of the national minorities and ethnic groups have the right, according to their number, to a proportionate share of broadcast time in public radio broadcasting [Article 5 of Law 270/1993 of the Code on Slovak Radio] and public television broadcasting [Article 3 of Law 271/1993 of the Code on Slovak Television].

5. The radio and television broadcasts for national minorities are provided in their language on both national and regional levels.

6. The members of the national minorities and ethnic groups have the right to produce and distribute sound and audiovisual works recorded in their mother tongue for both children and adults.

7. Both periodical and nonperiodical publications for the needs of the national minorities and ethnic groups may be published in their language.

8. Occasional publications addressed to the public—gallery, museum, and library catalogues; theater and concert programs; and other cultural undertakings in communities and higher administrative units where members of a particular national minority or ethnic group make up at least 10 percent of the total population—are published only in their mother tongue.

9. The members of the national minorities and ethnic groups have the right to be represented on the councils established according to the law to guarantee freedom and plurality of public radio broadcasts [Article 7 of Law 270/1993 of the Code] and public television broadcasts [Article 7 of Law 271/1993 of the Code and Article 10, Paragraph 3 of Law 268/1993 of the Code on operation of radio and television broadcast regarding the text of earlier regulations].

10. The members of the national minorities and ethnic groups have the right to receive an appropriate contribution from the state budget or public funds for the support of their activities in the spirit of this provision. The amount of the contribution shall be based on their relative representation in society.

Article 8

Use of the Languages of National Minorities in the Armed Forces, Armed Corps, and Fire-Fighting Service

1. The members of the national minorities and ethnic groups may use their language in private communication and cultural undertakings even in the Armed Forces. This does not affect the use of the state language as the language of command in the Armed Forces and armed corps.

2. In communities and higher administrative units where members of a particular national minority or ethnic group make up at least 10 percent of the total population, the business of the fire-fighting service may be conducted also in the language of the national minority or ethnic group, and, if appropriate, the language of the national minority or ethnic group may also be the language of command. The provisions of Article 3 of this law apply also to the local police.

Article 9

Use of the Languages of National Minorities and Ethnic Groups in the Economy, Services, and Health Care

1. The members of the national minorities and ethnic groups have the right to use their language in economic and social life.

2. The communication between staff and patients in the health-care system and social institutions may be conducted without limitation also in the language of a national minority or ethnic group. In communities and higher administrative units where members of a particular national minority or ethnic group make up at least 10 percent of the total population, the public and professional information in the health-care system

and social institutions and public health education are provided also in the language of the national minorities and ethnic groups. In these institutions, applicants for employment with a command of the language of the national minorities and ethnic groups shall be given priority. This requirement cannot be considered as discrimination against other qualified applicants.

3. Public signs, notices, and advertisements to inform the public shall also be presented in the language of the national minorities, including the Romany language, in the communities and higher administrative units where members of a particular national minority or ethnic group make up at least 10 percent of the total population. In these communities and higher administrative units, safety regulations shall be issued also in the language of national minorities and ethnic groups, and safety signs and notices shall be written also in their language.

4. In the interest of the protection of the consumer, instructions for the use of chemicals and pharmaceuticals and directions for preparing food sold in the communities and higher administrative units where members of a particular national minority or ethnic group make up at least 10 percent of the total population are enclosed also in their mother tongue [Law 634/1992 on the Protection of the Consumer and Law 152/1995 of the Code on Food, Article 9]

Article 10

Temporary and Concluding Provisions

1. The state authorities and state organizations, bodies of public administration, public institutions, and local self-administration authorities will guarantee the conditions for the unhindered exercise of the rights enshrined in this law.

2. On the day this law goes into effect, all legislative regulations, all prohibitions and limitations regarding the use of the languages of the national minorities and ethnic groups that contradict this law become null and void.

3. On the day this law goes into effect, all clauses in internal regulations of legal persons or natural persons conducting business that prohibit or limit the use of the languages of national minorities and ethnic groups are abrogated.

4. In communities and higher administrative units where members of a particular national minority or ethnic group make up at least 10 percent of the total population, the provisions of National Council of the Slovak Republic Law 270/1995, Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 5 of Article 3; Paragraphs 1, 3, and 4 of Article 4; the provisions of Paragraphs 3, 6, and 7 of Article 5; the provisions of Paragraphs 1, 2, and 5 of Article 7; the provisions of Paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 of Article 8; the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 10; and the provisions of Paragraph 1 of Article 11 no longer apply. The provisions of this law apply instead of them.

5. The provisions of National Council of the Slovak Republic Law 270/1995, Paragraph 4 of Article 5 are amended as follows: "The broadcasts of regional or local television stations, radio stations, and radio institutions are conducted in the national language, with the exception of the broadcasts of these stations and institutions for national minorities and ethnic groups. Such broadcasts are conducted in the languages of national minorities and ethnic groups."

6. Article 10 of National Council of the Slovak Republic Law 270/1995 is abrogated.

Article 11

Effect of the Law

This law takes effect on the day of promulgation.

Note: This draft is based on the European Charter on Regional or Minority Languages, the Framework Agreement on the Protection of Ethnic Minorities, Law 122/1920 on the Principles of Language Right in the Czechoslovak Republic regarding Article 129 of the Constitution of the Czechoslovak Republic of 1920, and the Government Decree dated 3 February 1926 No. 17 of the Code, which enacts Constitutional Law 122 of 1920.

Slovakia: Coexistence on Territorial Division Plan

AU3001135896 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 26 Jan 96 p 4

[Article by Jozsef Kvarda, Coexistence deputy chairman and MP: "Counties as a Solution"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The draft law on the territorial and administrative arrangement of the Slovak Republic is now going through the process of interdepartmental appraisal. It will soon be discussed by the Government Council for State Administration and Regional Self-Administration and, subsequently, by the government. This procedure is apparently supposed to replace public discussion among experts, which is lacking. The complex reform of public administration is both a specialized and a political problem. In spite of this, government coalition parties are not engaged in any talks with the parliamentary opposition parties, let alone with the extraparliamentary parties and movements. This situation is causing dissatisfaction among mayors, deputies of local self-administration bodies, and other citizens, and tension in society at large because this is a problem that affects each of us. The government-sponsored draft law on the territorial and administrative arrangement of the Slovak Republic foresees the creation of eight higher administrative entities (regions) and 81, or, alternatively, 68 lower administrative entities (districts). It mentions the existence of higher self-administered territorial entities but does not define them. Three basic areas of problems have not been defined to this day: what tasks the community will perform after the law's passage; what tasks will belong to the self-administration body of the higher territorial entity; and what tasks the state will have. Territorial and administrative arrangement and the new organization of public administration constitute a mutually organically intertwined system. Basically, the government's draft addresses only the problem of further reinforcement of the already centralized state power. It does not address the problem of genuine division of power between communities, higher territorial entities, and the state. Likewise, it does not establish any prerequisites for the establishment of a well-functioning, modern, and internally sufficiently consistent public administration. In the government's perception, the national and state interest is for public administration to be a mere instrument for exercising power over, and controlling, the pertinent territorial entities and their population. The fact that, in modern European states, public administration is based on the principles of the European Charter of Regional Self-Administration, accepts the subsidiarity principle, and is designed to serve citizens and help implement good laws, is of secondary importance, in the government's view.

The government's draft of the law contains strong antiminority ammunition. The present districts of Dunajska Streda and Komarno, in which the Hungarian population constitutes the clear majority, are to be incorporated into three different regions. The districts of Roznava and Rimavska Sobota will also belong to different regions, to say nothing of the administrative subdistricts [spravne obvody] of Kralovsky Chlmec and Velke Kapusany. The draft completely ignores the fact that there exist more than 400 communities in Slovakia with a Hungarian majority and that this population requires a specific solution in view of its different culture. Such a solution offers itself in the document approved at the Komarno rally [organized by the Association of Towns and Villages from southern Slovakia] on 8 January 1994. It is necessary to arrive at such a solution in the foreseeable future, in the interest of general efficiency.

The proposal known as the Minaric version (counties variant) could serve as a starting point for talks. In our opinion, the present subdistricts [obvody] should be retained as districts [okresy], to head off unnecessary tension in various regions of Slovakia. However, the main goal we want to achieve as far as the southern parts of the Republic are concerned is the acceptance of the conclusions of the so-called Komarno rally.

[Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak on 29 January on page 1 carries a 200-word report by "da" on a meeting of the Coexistence National Council held at Tesedikovo, Galanta district, on 27 January. The report states: "The National Council disagrees with the government's proposal for the territorial division of the Slovak Republic because this proposal does not consider the optimal needs of the Hungarian nationality. If the government does not change its position, Coexistence will organize, among other things, another meeting of self-administrations from southern Slovakia, similar to the Komarno rally of 8 January 1994. The Coexistence Movement wants a nationwide referendum on the principles of territorial arrangement to be called following a broad discussion of citizens. It will propose this possibility to its coalition partners this week."]

Slovakia: HZDS Body Calls For Shortened Term for Kovac

AU3001160596 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak 29 Jan 96 p 2

[Article by "mb": "Ruling Movement's District Assembly: Shorten President's Term of Office!"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Banska Bystrica—The latest proposal on the part of the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and its coalition partners on how to unseat President Michal Kovac appeared in an appeal that delegates to the HZDS Banska Bystrica District Assembly adopted on 27 January. In response to the opinions and standpoints of HZDS members in Banska Bystrica district, the delegates appeal to the president to finally stop sustaining and nourishing the, in their opinion, false illusion about himself as the sole competent guarantor of democracy and an untiring, unbreakable, and irreplaceable fighter for truth and the rights of people in Slovakia. The appeal states that the president is not the person he is pretending to be, that he is not the president of all citizens of Slovakia, from whom he became estranged a long time ago by his anti-Slovak activities to date at home and abroad, and that also the New Year's address indicated that the president is moving in the vicious circle of gloomy visions, negativism, intolerance, and polarization and traumatization of society. In the appeal, the delegates call on the National Council of the Slovak Republic to make use of the rights vested in it by the Constitution of the Slovak Republic and to shorten Michal Kovac's term of office so that it ends by 30 June 1996 at the latest.

Slovakia: Most of Leadership Wants Fico To Head SDL

*AU3101110096 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
29 Jan 96 pp 1-2*

[Article by Martin Krno: "26 Candidates for SDL Chairman; Best Chance Given to Robert Fico"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Liptovsky Mikulas—[passage omitted] The all-Slovak celebrations of the fifth anniversary of the Party of the Democratic Left [SDL] culminated in a ball in Liptovsky Mikulas on 27 January. The festivities were preceded by a working meeting of the SDL Republican Council, which approved the drafts of three policy documents. Following their critical appraisal by the member base, the documents will be presented to the Fourth SDL Congress in Nitra toward the end of April. The Political Program defines the values of democratic socialism that the party espouses. [passage omitted] The Action Program focuses on the party's most acute tasks in enforcing and defending the interests of workers, employees, the intelligentsia, and other social strata. The proposed Program of Reviving Internal Party Life should help introduce a new spirit into organizational structures, many of which have remained inactive and on the defensive in the wake of the unsuccessful parliamentary elections. As for personnel issues, in keeping with a previous agreement, district committees submitted by 15 January proposals that emerged from deliberations of SDL primary organizations. A total of 26 names of better and lesser known candidates for SDL chairman and 32 proposals for the post of SDL deputy chairman have arrived in [the SDL head office in] Bratislava. Another selection round is expected because the view prevails in the SDL Republican Council that a single candidate for the post of party chairman ought to be submitted to the congress. Incidentally, in an anonymous, unofficial survey conducted among participants in the Republican Council meeting, Robert Fico, chairman of the Common Choice club of deputies, won the largest number of votes. Next came Lubomir Fogas, Peter Magvasi, Pavol Kanis, and Brigita Schmognerova.

In a festive speech to SDL members and sympathizers in the afternoon, current SDL Chairman Peter Weiss said, among other things, that the party has a sufficient number of strong political personalities. The issue now is how to utilize and integrate the potential and abilities of these personalities and how to shape a leadership that will be able to expand the party's present voter base. [passage omitted]

Slovakia: SDSS Expels Ex-Chairman Zala From Party

*AU3101073696 Bratislava PRAVDA in Slovak
29 Jan 96 pp 1-2*

[Article by Nora Sliskova: "The Social Democratic Party of Slovakia Decided on Termination of Membership of Three Faction Representatives"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Bratislava—The Social Democratic Party of Slovakia [SDSS] Central Council finally solved the problem of the SDSS's Revival faction on 27 January when it decided by a three-fifths majority on the termination of membership of Boris Zala, Viliam Hotar, and Lubomir Kohut.

In the opinion of the SDSS Central Council, the three severely violated the party statutes and did not respect the resolutions of supreme SDSS bodies. According to the SDSS Central Council's decision, the three must not be readmitted into the party within a period of one year.

As for the remaining four members of the faction, which was established shortly after the Fourth SDSS Congress, the Central Council decided on their remaining in the party on the basis of their written pledge to terminate the faction's activity and to act in conformity with the party statutes and congress resolutions. The four are I. Laluha, J. Jancik, L. Krajci, and S. Petery. "This decision set a precedent, and the Central Council can now refer to an example of possible procedure in the event of serious violation of the statutes," SDSS Deputy Chairman Miroslav Spejl said when commenting on the results of the Central Council session. He said at the same time that the SDSS leadership would do everything within its power for party members holding different views to have sufficient scope for their presentation in the party. "This is not to say that they did not have this scope up to now; they just did not make use of it," he added.

The SDSS also dealt with the preparation of a series of talks with other parliamentary parties, including representatives of the government coalition Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] and Association of Workers of Slovakia. The HZDS Political Board should decide at its meeting today whether it will accept the SDSS's offer. The talks should concern the coming meeting of the National Council, social issues, and the ratification of the interstate treaty with Hungary. At its meeting on Saturday, the SDSS Central Council also decided to establish the Alexander Dubcek Prize.

[Bratislava NARODNA OBRODA in Slovak on 29 January on pages 1 and 2 carries a 400-word report by Martin Kovacic on the SDSS Central Council meeting entitled "Former SDSS Chairman Boris Zala Expelled From the Party." According to the report, Boris Zala, who used to be SDSS chairman, told NARODNA OBRODA that the decision on the termination of membership of three members of the Revival faction is "a personal act of revenge," motivated by faction members' criticism of SDSS Chairman Jaroslav Volf's policies. Zala criticizes the SDSS statutes as "undemocratic" because, "unlike the statutes of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia at the time of the worst normalization, they do not even permit the possibility of appealing the decision" and declares that he is not planning to join any other party "in the near future."]

Hungary: HTMH View on Autonomy for Ethnic Hungarians

96CH0019B Bucharest ROMANIAI MAGYAR SZO in Hungarian 5 Dec 95 p 2

[Interview with Laszlo Labody, titular state secretary and chairman of the Office for Hungarians Beyond the Borders, HTMH, by Janos Gyarmath in Zalau on 28 November 1995: "What the Hungarian Government Can and Cannot Do—Talk With Titular State Secretary Laszlo Labody, Director of the Office for Hungarians Beyond the Border"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Gyarmath] There is an ongoing debate on autonomy and its various forms, not only in connection with the majority-minority issue but also within the minorities. About a year ago, Mr. Csaba Tabajdi said that the UDMR [Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania, UDMR in Romanian, RMDSZ in Hungarian] program and concept of autonomy is not entirely clear and unequivocal. But Hungarian Government officials kept supporting the principle, nevertheless. In your opinion, how far can the Hungarian Government, or Hungary for that matter, go in being a staunch supporter of autonomy?

[Labody] I believe I was one of those very few who chose their words very precisely when I said that the Hungarian Government supports the principle of autonomy, for it is our conviction that autonomy is the only solution, for the word autonomy means nothing but self-government. It means that a community can take care of its own affairs and get organized on the basis of whatever principle. Church autonomy is natural. For a church is a community, taking care of the affairs of a group of people who have the same faith. The same way, an autonomous government of a town takes care of the everyday affairs of people living in a specific area. In these terms, it is also clear what ethnic autonomy means. It means that people who belong to the same ethnic group, speak the same language, and have the same culture, try to take care of their own affairs. This is an entirely justified and natural endeavor.

In this sense, democracy is nothing but an aggregate of autonomies. Thus, in the way Csaba Tabajdi has put it at the conference on the subject, a well-functioning democracy is nothing but adjoining autonomies or self-governments. This is the same in essence as decentralization, namely, that decisions are made at the level of a given community they affect. In essence, the autonomy of churches, universities, civil society, and institutions is but adjoining autonomies. This is what democracy is all about, for democracy is more than just people simply going to vote. True, voting is indispensable but not enough. Ethnic autonomy, too, simply means that a community is taking care of its own affairs. The question is whether or not the government makes this possible. At the same time, we must distinguish between autonomy and self-administration, for the community is part of civil society's numerous institutions. Obviously, public administration must be compatible with [that of] the government. It is part of the government, for the government speaks to the citizens and vice versa. This is where tragic misunderstandings happen. For, in this sense, we do indeed support autonomy; that is, the possibility for a community to take care of its own affairs, which is, by the way, the most natural thing in the world.

Well, then, what can the Hungarian Government do in this regard? There are a few things it absolutely cannot do. Let us first see what it cannot do. First, it will not work out a concrete plan, for it is not the business of the Hungarian Government to be familiar with Romanian, Slovak, Yugoslav, Ukrainian, etc. law, or to define the areas of authority or need. These things must be done by the given communities themselves. Next, the Hungarian Government will not negotiate. It will not negotiate in the sense that the decisions will be made in the Romanian, Slovak, or Ukrainian parliament where the governing laws will have to be legislated. Obviously, the Hungarian Government cannot make these parliaments legislate the laws it deems necessary.

On the other hand, what the Hungarian Government can offer is the following. It can compile, organize, and forward international solutions, for many ideas and solutions have accumulated throughout Europe. The well-known examples or Southern Tirol or Finland are not the only ones we are referring to. Other examples include the entire system of autonomies in Spain as well as Wales or France. So, we can help in bringing attention to these. We can also help in reconciling the given communities' own concepts with international practices and possibilities.

Moreover, we can help, through our bilateral and international relations, in trying to make the West and the world understand that what the Hungarian communities want is to have an opportunity in a democratic constitutional state to live—wherever they live—as Hungarians and as loyal citizens. As opposed to ill-willed mudslinging, they want to prove that they are indeed loyal to the government. They want to be loyal to a government. But one can only be loyal to a government with which one is satisfied, to one that does not constantly harass one and does not interfere every day with one's life; to one that does not specify the language one must use in a hospital or during one's wedding. For this is where the realm of absurdities begins, this is where the question arises, how can one be loyal to such a government? Obviously, that is very hard. The Hungarian Government can help not only in this but also in wording the treaty accordingly and in playing a role in the treaty's enforcement. This is, then, the framework in which we can and must think. I could even say that this is the framework for a healthy division of labor.

[Gyarmath] If I understand it correctly, the Romanian-Hungarian talks have centered lately on two levels, namely, on reconciliation and on the treaty. It seems, then, that the negotiations will be conducted by two work teams. We know that this is a task for diplomats, but we also know that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regularly consults with the HTMH [Office for Hungarians Beyond the Border]. Our question would be, then, to what extent can the HTMH enforce all of what has been mentioned so far, i.e., to what extent can it influence the bilateral talks?

[Labody] I must begin by noting that there has been an extensive cooperation in this regard with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. As far as the process of treaty negotiations is concerned, we can state that we were not only involved in its preparation but were also part of the negotiating team. And I would also add that it is entirely our task to reconcile with the Hungarian organizations. For instance, in preparing the treaty with Slovakia, we reconciled with the Hungarian coalition parties in Slovakia 17 times before and during the talks. Thus, in this sense, we are part of both the thought process and the conceptualization, and the implementation.

With regard to reconciliation and the treaty negotiations, the former was already part of the socialist party's election platform, and is now a definite part of the government program. I can also say, then, that it was the Hungarian Government that took the initiative, and I can only applaud the fact that President Iliescu was receptive, indeed, he himself feels that this is necessary. It was during the negotiations when the necessity of negotiating became apparent, even though they did not or do not accomplish much at present (after all, they did not result in a treaty), for it became clear why a treaty cannot be signed. The text of the treaty is completed, inasmuch as the translations have been checked and it was scrutinized in other languages as well, with the exception of a single paragraph—the one dealing with the minority issue.

Had there not been any negotiations, we could cite many reasons for not being able to come to terms. This way, however, we know exactly what the open question is. And why is it an open question? Because it is an open question even within Romania. Thus, I think that the logical continuation would have to be to look at and scrutinize this issue, to determine the exact nature of the problem, what the allegations are on either side. This must be the direction of the negotiations.

If, aside from the treaty and historical reconciliation, we only listen to our common sense and deal with those issues that are part of our daily life (normalizing border crossing without being subjected to humiliating tortures and having to wait for hours; improving the traffic and telecommunication, i.e., the infrastructure between the two countries; developing the kind of economic cooperation that is expected between two neighboring countries of almost the same level of development; having a normal educational and cultural exchange in which diplomas are mutually accepted without hassle), then, I think that we accomplish much without any large-scale political declaration. Then we accomplish things that are beneficial for everyone: for Hungarians living in Romania, Romanians living in Romania, or Romanians or Hungarians living in Hungary. This does not—cannot—mean that this everyday pragmatism should make us relinquish our idea of supporting autonomy, for the two must go hand in hand. We will accomplish nothing without negotiations, be they called reconciliation or anything else. Great objectives and small everyday practices do not substitute but complement each other.

[Gyarmath] Following the appointment of HTMH officials, it was promised that the assistance to Hungarian organizations and communities beyond the borders will be "put in order" and that the entire system of grants will be made open and clear. What has been done in this regard?

[Labody] We have put an end to the ongoing debates...

[Gyarmath] Has anyone been called to account when it seemed necessary?

[Labody] There was no need to call anyone to account, for we have not discovered any corrupt practice. There was one disputed issue which was closed through an agreement between the parties involved. Obviously, as the involved parties were able to come to terms, there was no need for intervention. There were some cases in which the conflict turned out to be based on mere allegations. The latest such conflict involved the Foundation for Hungarians of Delvidek [Southland], but I would add that it was not about public funds. I just received the auditor's report. If you remember, it drew a lot of attention a year ago. But the investigation found everything in order. The "scandal" broke out simply because of unfounded allegations... So, there were no cases in which public funds were involved and in which legal or criminal action was necessary. Not everything can, or should, be controlled from Budapest. And, of course, not only the grantor but also the grantee has responsibilities, i.e., both have to monitor where the money goes. Obviously, the situation five years ago did not allow any mention about such things.

Since then, organizations have developed their own mechanism of internal control; we, too, have developed a system in which we can follow exactly what happens to a grant. For instance, the committees of the Illyes Foundation's board of trustees proved to be very efficient in helping things go right. In the meantime, the responsibilities of the government and of civil society have been clarified. The government now finances basically four areas. The Illyes Public Foundation provides assistance in the area of identity preservation, i.e., in that of education, culture, civil society, and the churches. Another huge area is an economic one, i.e., that of assisting ventures; this is done by the New Handshake Foundation. The third area is that of the Helping Right-Hand Foundation, which provides assistance in the area of health care. The fourth area also involves education and culture in general but is more professional-oriented, i.e., that of book publishing, theater, scholarships and so forth. Efficient work is being done in all four areas through a good and—what is important—clear-cut system. With regard to the needs vs. possibilities, well, the two will never meet, will never overlap. But in considering that [the extent of] assistance has grown over the years, I must say that significant amounts of capital have flown into the respective countries, reaching the Hungarians living there.

What will happen in 1996? It is no secret, for the items and figures are listed in the national budget. The Illyes Foundation's budget will be 340 million [forints, Ft], that of the New Handshake will be 200 million, that of the Helping Right-Hand will be 130 million, and that of the Ministry of Education will be Ft400 million. This amounts to more than a billion forints, and this figure has not changed for years. True, its real value has decreased, but one must consider not only our country's situation but also what we must allocate money for. It must be channeled where a new need would eventually arise because the investment created something that works.

B-H: Assembly Confirms Muratovic as Prime Minister

AU3001170796 Paris AFP in English 1531 GMT 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 30 (AFP) — The Bosnian parliament on Tuesday [30 January] confirmed Hasan Muratovic as prime minister.

There were 95 votes in his favour and five against. Muratovic was nominated on January 21 by the collective presidency.

B-H: AFP Profiles New Prime Minister Muratovic

AU3001174896 Paris AFP in English 1716 GMT 30 Jan 96

[Report by Edina Neretljak]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 30 (AFP) — Bosnia's new prime minister, Hasan Muratovic, comes to the job with a reputation as a capable manager, a tough negotiator and a close ally of the man he replaced — Haris Silajdzic.

Muratovic is a familiar face to western officials with whom he has worked as minister for relations with the NATO-led Implementation Force in Bosnia's outgoing government.

The English-speaking Muratovic won respect by leading the Moslem-dominated government's key negotiations with foreign diplomats and military officials.

The new premier is not a member of the ruling Moslem Party of Democratic Action and has kept his distance from much of Bosnia's complex behind-the-scenes political maneuvering.

Dubbed "Haris's man" by observers here, Muratovic often acted as Silajdzic's right-hand man in reaching important decisions.

The two men's closeness was hinted at last week when Muratovic was nominated for the job after Silajdzic resigned saying he feared "totalitarian tendencies" in the government. Muratovic said then that he accepted the post reluctantly, insisting that "Mr. Silajdzic is the man we need, but unfortunately he has refused to be prime minister."

His reservations were compounded, he added, by the prospect of the "difficult times ahead for the government."

Last August the ruling party offered Muratovic the job when Silajdzic tendered his resignation, but Muratovic turned it down.

Born in the village of Cude north of Sarajevo, the 56-year-old Muratovic studied engineering in Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia, and received his doctorate in management from Belgrade University.

The manager of several large Bosnian industrial concerns, he worked in Zambia for three years, and ran a successful consultancy firm during Yugoslavia's communist era. He was also professor of economics and electrical engineering at Sarajevo University.

Muratovic entered Bosnia's first war-time government in June 1992 as a minister of forestry, and won a promotion to minister without portfolio in charge of relations with the United Nations when Silajdzic became premier in October 1993.

He continued in the same post for two and half years, before the UN Protection Force was replaced by the NATO-led Implementation Force last December.

An IFOR official who asked not be named called him "a good choice because he is the only capable one among the Moslems for such a posting but he is unpredictable."

Bosnia's central government is due to be replaced later this year after parliamentary elections due by mid-September at the latest under the Dayton peace accords which ended the former Yugoslav republic's three and a half year war.

The new central government will include members from the Serb entity created under the Dayton accords along with a Croat-Moslem federation.

However, the central government's powers are limited — one of the reasons behind Silajdzic's resignation — with much power shifted to the Croat-Moslem federation and Serb entity.

Dayton is likely to spark a power struggle within the Croat-Moslem federation, observers here say.

B-H: New PM Muratovic Outlines Government Priorities

AU3001181396 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1447 GMT 30 Jan 96

[Report by Senada Cumurovic]

[FBIS Translated Text] I will briefly summarize the program of Dr. Hasan Muratovic, which he presented today to the Assembly of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Dr. Muratovic started his address by concluding that the war is over, but that the danger of conflict still exists and the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina will need a long time, and they will need to struggle to resume normal lives, such as are lived in the civilized world.

He also mentioned that the agreement on the revival of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Federation signed in Dayton on 9 November envisaged a personnel and functional division into the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Federation Government. The essence of this agreement, Dr. Muratovic said, is that the Republic Government can keep only the functions that enable it to function as the government of the internationally recognized state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. All the other functions are to be transferred to the Federation Government. At the same time there will be civilian authorities and their bodies in the parts of the Federation under the control of the Croatian Defense Council. The existing authorities now have to be transferred, that is, they have to transfer their functions to Federation bodies and they themselves have to be disbanded.

Dr. Muratovic also stressed that the functions of the central government (?will remain) the same after the elections, but will have new personnel with the representatives of the Serb entity to be elected at democratic elections. The task of the new central government is to try to create conditions even now in the Serb entity so that it is ready to function as the Federation, of course, immediately after the elections.

In accordance with the decision made at the previous session of the Republic Assembly, Dr. Muratovic also listed five ministries and five ministers, and one minister without portfolio. Dr. Jadranko Prlic is the foreign minister, Mirsad Kikanovic is finance minister, Hilmo Pasic is minister for justice and administration, Nurzeim Recica is minister for refugees and displaced persons, Neven Tomic is minister for trade and international communications, and Dragoljub Stojanov is minister without portfolio.

The basis for the program of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, as Dr. Muratovic said, stems from the global goals of our state, and we are committed to achieving these goals consistently, he said. He singled out two groups of aims in his address: political and economic. He said that everything would be done to ensure that the state that was being built was built on the entire territory of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

As for the primary goal in the economic sphere, this is economic recovery and employment. Without employing people, Dr. Muratovic said, not a single goal could be attained, including complete peace in the country. He listed several basic points determined by the sphere to which they belong: foreign affairs, justice and administration, international communications, and several other points. These will most likely be the basis for the work of the Government of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina under his premiership.

Turning to foreign affairs, Dr. Muratovic said that they would be continuing to conduct an active foreign policy and work on the recognition of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina by those countries that still have not recognized Bosnia-Herzegovina, those with which we still did not have diplomatic relations. Everything would also be done to improve relations in the region. As for relations with, as he put it, the new Yugoslavia, we cannot forget the evil that it had inflicted on us, but, also for the sake of the Serbs and the Serb entity, we will have to develop and normalize relations gradually. He said our goal was also EU and NATO membership through the Partnership for Peace program.

The second point in his address came under the title of justice and administration. Dr. Muratovic said that we would be establishing a legal framework and instruments for a legal state and its functioning in relations with the world, and of course for linking up the two entities within the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina. After an agreement on the status of administrative organizations at the state level is reached, these organizations will be structured and organized in a modern fashion. He also said in his address that we would be cooperating with the International War Crimes Tribunal and international legal institutions, and of course enable the state to function effectively in the spheres of citizenship, travel documents, asylum, and other functions that fall within this sphere.

The third point, that is, the third part of his program, is entitled finances. Dr. Muratovic said that the finances at the state level would cover all the functions that mark the economic sovereignty of a country and added that a proposal would be drafted for an agreement and realization of the program on the central bank and the currency, the privatization of banks, a unified customs policy and supervision of the customs administration, and functions covered by non-banking financial institutions.

A very important issue, of course, is refugees. Our goal is to have all the citizens of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina return to the country, if they want to, and to rebuild this country together with us. The principle, Muratovic said, is to have the refugees return once conditions are created for their return and for the normalization of life. In that respect we will continue to work together with the UNHCR, the host countries, the donators for our economic recovery, and international financial institutions.

As for foreign trade, Dr. Muratovic said that Bosnia-Herzegovina had to be open to international trade and flow of goods. We also have to turn to the transfer of technology, the import of capital through all forms of economic cooperation, and a full liberalization of foreign investment.

Dr. Muratovic also mentioned another important issue: international communications. There are huge problems in the establishment of telecommunications, air traffic, rail and road links to the world, the radio and television coverage of the territory. This is all understandable in view of the level of destruction of the communications during the aggression on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Dr. Muratovic added that these were, of course, only the most significant functions of the Republic Government, that this government was asked not only to secure survival but also normal life and progress, and for that reason this government was not expected to be engaged in high politics, but to work on economic and social prosperity, and to solve everyday problems. Dr. Muratovic as prime minister promised that the government would do just that.

B-H: New Prime Minister Muratovic Interviewed

LD3001234196 Zagreb HTV Television in Serbo-Croatian 2140 GMT 30 Jan 96

[Interview with Bosnian Prime Minister Hasan Muratovic by unidentified correspondent on 30 January; place not given — monitored in progress; live or recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Muratovic] ...in which one is happy at being elected as prime minister. Very big tasks and problems face us, but we must proceed.

[Correspondent] To start our conversation I would like to quote some kind of catch phrase in your inaugural speech in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly today, where you say: We cannot live in the past because we cannot agree on it; instead we should live in the future, and we must reach agreement on this future. In your view what are the biggest obstacles to the people in Bosnia-Herzegovina reaching an agreement on the future?

[Muratovic] The biggest obstacles are still political in nature. Above all, the Serb entity is still pushing for more, they are promoting apartheid, they want to be a completely independent republic within Bosnia-Herzegovina, but there will also probably be problems over the distribution of resources, or rather the financial aid which the world will be giving us. In the Federation, I believe that we will not have any big problems in channelling this money — at least up to now we have not had such problems — but I am sure that there will be problems with the Serb Republic when it, too, joins our state, practically speaking.

[Correspondent] Mr. Muratovic, does this mean that in fact all of the international community's aid will go through your government, in other words the central government?

[Muratovic] That is what we have sought and what we have always agreed with the international institutions. Naturally, there will be donors who will want to give their aid directly to the Serb entity. However, there is a consensus that until something is done in terms of democracy and a multi-party system there, it will not receive any assistance apart from humanitarian aid, and apart from aid for infrastructural facilities which are relevant both to the federation and the Serb entity.

[Correspondent] What is your estimation of what Bosnia-Herzegovina needs in this initial drive, if I may put it this way, for reconstruction, and how much money has the international community promised?

[Muratovic] The promised amount is at present $5.1 billion over three years. This really is not enough to carry out the reconstruction of our whole economy, but it is assistance which will make it possible for a good deal to be done to improve the infrastructure and to allow some companies to start work. Of course, at least our expectation is such, there will also be bilateral aid over and above these gifts arising out of the donors' conference, which should take place in April.

[Correspondent] What will be the priorities in making use of this money that comes in? Which industries will you stimulate initially? What will, in fact, be the basis for the development of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Muratovic] There are certain problems with the international community here. The international community wants, primarily, to finance infrastructural projects, that is, roads, railways, air transport, telecommunications, etc., which is, indeed, exceptionally important. However, we believe that the most important thing is to invest the money to create jobs, and give people employment, so that they might become economically independent.

I, personally, believe that above all help should be given to enterprises which have not been greatly damaged, and financial help should also be given to private entrepreneurs so that they can set in train further industrial development, but on condition that they guarantee that they will employ a certain number of people and that of course they produce a certain economic... [as heard].

[Correspondent] In your estimation, how much of this money — of the $5.1 billion arriving in Bosnia-Herzegovina over three years — will be required for social problems which are certainly difficult throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially in the most war-torn parts?

[Muratovic] I have to say that this money — apart from some of it that should be earmarked for the return of refugees, and there are other funds, apart from this $5.1 billion, for the return of refugees — this money will not be spent purely on social welfare payments. The international community is not prepared to give money to support the population further. They will receive support by other means, from the UNHCR or the United Nations, and via nongovernmental aid organizations. So all this money is earmarked purely for reconstruction, that is, the reconstruction of the infrastructure, the regeneration of industry, and naturally, some will also be spent on the regeneration of sports, etc.

[Correspondent] As regards to foreign policy issues, what are the strategic guidelines of the future foreign policy of your government, the central government of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Muratovic] In my inaugural speech, I set these out in the following order: further work on the recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina; the second thing is the development of economic and friendly relations with Croatia — this is a strategic goal of Bosnia-Herzegovina; third, we need a balanced relationship with Western and Islamic countries.

[Correspondent] What will relations with Belgrade be like? What kind of rhythm of rapprochement to you envisage here?

[Muratovic] We believe that we must develop our relations with Serbia, but we should not forget the evil they have perpetrated against us. However, because of the Serb entity and because of our geopolitical situation, we should develop our relations with the new Yugoslavia, if I may call it this now — pending the establishment of diplomatic relations between us.

[Correspondent] Today, we saw the pictures and received reports that Nikola Koljevic was in Sarajevo and that he said he felt nostalgic. How do you see these statements and his visit to Sarajevo?

[Muratovic] The Serbs have been coming to Sarajevo for three weeks now. Apart from Krajisnik, we have had more or less all those whom you see on TV. I see this as a kind of normalization of relations. Believe me, we do not attach any special importance to this. They are coming here almost as a matter of routine now. No one takes any special note when they enter or come out of that building occupied by Carl Bildt.

[Correspondent] Good. Mr. Muratovic, just one more question before we end. At the beginning you said it would be necessary to develop democratic institutions in Bosnia. Bosnia-Herzegovina has elections soon. In some way the withdrawal of Haris Silajdzic — that is how we see it here in Zagreb — probably has something to do with this. How would you comment on his departure, and in your opinion what role will Haris Silajdzic have in the future political life of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

[Muratovic] At first I was disappointed by his departure because we worked well together, and the whole government cooperated well with Mr. Silajdzic. I believe he will not remain outside political life; he will certainly be active, but I could not say in which way.

[Correspondent] What does the decision that he is not a member of the Democratic Action Party [SDA] any longer mean?

[Muratovic] I think that such a decision has not been made. Only his resignation from the post of SDA vice chairman was accepted. But his membership was not discussed. I think this is a matter for each member to decide whether he will stay in the party or leave.

[Correspondent] Mr. Muratovic, thank you for this conversation and I wish you a lot of success in the difficult job awaiting you.

[Muratovic] Thank you very much.

B-H: Biographies of New Republic Ministers Provided

AU3001181296 Paris AFP in English
1748 GMT 30 Jan 96

[Report by Edina Neretljak: Bosnian Republic Government: Continuity of a Rule]

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Sarajevo, Jan 30 (AFP) — Incoming premier Hasan Muratovic revealed a revamped six-man cabinet Tuesday [30 January] with a senior Croat named vice-premier, and foreign minister Muhamed Sacirbegovic a notable absentee.

Despite the addition of two new faces, observers said continuity was the key feature of the new cabinet, named as Bosnia lays the groundwork for its first post-war elections set for mid-September by the latest.

Prime Minister: Formally appointed to the job by Bosnia's central parliament earlier Tuesday, Muratovic replaces Haris Silajdzic who resigned 10 days ago. A Moslem, Muratovic has been in government throughout the Bosnian war, first as forestry minister and later as minister in charge of relations with the United Nations and the NATO-led peace Implementation Force. A professor in economics, he is thought close to Silajdzic, and has earned a reputation as a capable manager and tough negotiator with rival Serbs and foreign diplomats and military officials.

Foreign Minister: Jadranko Prlic, a Croat, replaces the outspoken Sacirbegovic, who took the Moslem cause to the world first as UN ambassador and then as foreign minister. Prlic, a leading Croat official, has since 1994 held the posts of vice-premier and defence minister of both the republic of Bosnia and the Moslem-Croat federation. He is also a former premier of the Bosnian Croat republic of Herzeg-Bosnia proclaimed during the war. Prlic, a doctor in economics, has no experience in foreign affairs.

His nomination was the result of an agreement within the Moslem-Croat federation to give the Croats the Foreign Ministry and the Moslems the premiership in both the central government and the federation. Under the Dayton peace accords the Moslem-Croat federation and a Serb Republic will enjoy a large amount of autonomy from the central government based in Sarajevo.

Before the war Prlic was manager of a food conglomerate and the vice-premier of the last communist Bosnian Government that governed until 1990.

Refugees Minister: Nudzeim Recica, a Moslem, handled this portfolio in the first three years of the war before becoming director of Bosnia's repatriation office in Vienna.

Foreign Trade and Communications Minister: Neven Tomic, a Croat who has been finance minister since June 1994, is to take over this portfolio, likely to be crucial during the country's post-war reconstruction.

Minister Without Portfolio: Dragoljub Stojanov, a Serb, was foreign trade minister under Silajdzic from October 1993 until June 1994. An economics professor at the Economics Faculty of Sarajevo University, Stojanov is close to Muratovic, with whom he recently created Sarajevo's MIT Institute, a management and technology school.

Finance Minister: Mirsad Kikanovic is one of two new names in the cabinet. A Moslem, he hails from the northeastern Tuzla area, and ran the Tuzla canton's finances.

Public Administration Minister: Hilmo Pasic, also a Moslem, is the second new face. A lawyer from Visoko, a small town northwest of Sarajevo, he has worked with regional judicial authorities and the regional administration.

B-H: New Republic Ministers Outline Government Program

LD3001212796 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 30 Jan 96

[Passages within quotation marks are recorded]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] At the end of the 16th session of the Republic's parliament, we asked the newly elected prime minister and ministers what the first steps of the new government would be:

[Muratovic] "We should, above all, deal with practical problems and pave the way for the functioning of the whole state in keeping with the Constitution that was agreed on in Dayton. And above all we should combat economic and social impoverishment. This means that we should find employment for people, and make it possible for them to live in a more normal way than they have up to now, even before we manage to find employment for everyone."

[Correspondent] Asked what the orientation of our country's foreign policy will be, the newly elected foreign minister, Professor Jadranko Prlic, said:

[Prlic] "It will be oriented above all toward the further affirmation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, organized in keeping with the Dayton agreement. The basic tasks of Bosnia-Herzegovina's foreign policy have been set out in the inaugural speech by Dr. Muratovic, the new prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in keeping with this I will, together with other colleagues, over the coming days examine the overall situation in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, assess what the needs are, and make appropriate proposals. For those which are outside my remit, I need to obtain agreement from the competent authorities. I will deal with the things that are my responsibility, the aim being to form a strong state service that will be able to carry out all the tasks it faces, in keeping with the modern, civlization-based achievements in this sphere."

[Reporter] Dr. Mirsad Kikanovic was elected finance minister of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina today.

[Kikanovic] "The Finance Ministry will, in future, focus on the development of a unified economic system throughout the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this implies a single currency and a single central bank." [passage omitted]

B-H: Social Democrats To Form Shadow Government

LD3101234896 Sarajevo Televizija Bosne i Hercegovine in Serbo-Croatian 1830 GMT 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Representatives of the Union of Bosnia Herzegovina Social Democrats, whose chairman is Tuzla Mayor Selim Beslagic, held their regular news conference today.

Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats criticized the work of Bosnian Assembly, saying that the new Bosnian Government first had its ministers, the proposed cadres of the Croatian Democratic Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and only then the mandator of the government.

This inverse process creates a caricature of the procedure by which people are elected in parliament showing that in our parliamentary life we only mimick multiparty activity, Sejfudin Tokic, the vice president of the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats said today at the news conference in Sarajevo.

He said that the Union of Bosnia-Herzegovina Social Democrats, which is in the coordinating group of the five opposition parties, would initiate the formation of a shadow government whose task would be to address real and vital issues of the political life in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

According to Tokic, one of the reasons for the formation of such a government are the demonstrations which were held in Tuzla yesterday.

The demonstrations are justified and the exiles from Srebrenica cannot be subjects of financial frauds, Tokic said.

B-H: Opposition Party Leaders View Elections

AU3101102696 Rijeka NOVI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 27 Jan 96 pp 20-21

[Report by by Goran Vezic: "Democracy According to the Law of Interconnecting Vessels"]

[FBIS Translated Text] According to the Dayton agreement, the elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina should take place within nine months after its signing, at the latest. That means, that by the beginning of the fall, at the latest, the citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina will go to the elections. The first time they did so was in 1990, which was, as it seems from this perspective, a historical failure, because they turned the elections into a census. The parties without that had no national (that is, nationalist) trait, won, altogether, only some 10 percent of the votes. After the bitter experience of war, the situation can change and the Bosnian opposition, the members of the parties of a civic orientation, are counting on that, and preparing themselves for the new democratic circumstances in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

"I am convinced that we from the multiethnic and civic opposition parties cannot win less than we won in 1990," Rasim Kadic, president of the Liberal Party, says. "Europe has assigned some kind of supervisory role in the approaching elections to Sweden, so that, in Stockholm in the middle of January, the Swedish Government held a conference on the elections with the representatives of all Bosnian parliamentary parties. We took advantage of the fact that Split is still (as long as the bridges at Zupanja are not open for civilian traffic) the main transit center for Bosnia-Herzegovina to talk to the Bosnian opposition leaders at the Bellevue Hotel, where they stayed on their way back to Sarajevo."

Apart from Kadic, there were also Ivo Komsic, president of the Croatian National Council and founder of the Croatian Peasants' Party in Bosnia-Herzegovina [and member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency], and the vice presidents of the Social Democratic Party [SDP] and the Union of Bosnian Social Democrats [UBSD], Zlatko Lagumdzija and Sejfudin Tokic.

National, Social Democratic, and Liberal Bloc

"First of all, we expect the elections to be really free and democratic and to take place in a fair atmosphere, and we are working toward that," Kadic says, answering our question on the expectations of the Bosnian opposition in the next elections.

"Second, at this moment, we still cannot guarantee that the atmosphere will really be such, because there are still tensions and even murders, which do not actually consititute normal conditions. I am convinced that, in a couple of months, we will know whether the elections will take place, when, and how. Of course, we have been preparing ourselves as if they will take place at all levels. In some way, we have been given confirmation that the elections will take place toward the end of September or early in October and that they will certainly be on the federal, that is, entity level."

Kadic says that the electorate will be tied to the existing authorities by the war and its grave consequences:

"I hope that, nevertheless, we, as the people who participated in it, not in the sense of being in power, will win the votes of those people who can see that politics cannot be conducted in the way it has been conducted."

Talking about possible coalitions, Kadic thinks that there will be a strong national bloc, and that there will be a bloc consisting of other parties, which does not mean that the latter bloc of other parties will make a united list:

"Our overall assessment is that we will have at least three blocs — one of which will comprise the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] and the HDZ [Croatian Democratic Community]. The second bloc will be a social democratic bloc of the left, and the third could be a liberal, liberal-democratic one that will probably make some kind of coalition with the social democratic bloc, but it is too early to talk about that."

In the approaching elections, will there be any considerable stratification within separate national groups, unlike in the last elections when they represented homogeneous groups, we asked Ivo Komsic.

"In any case, the approaching elections — if they take place, of course — will show stratification within all three nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The question is only of how intensive that process will be and on what level it will be carried out, but there will certainly be stratification, because stratification has already occurred during the war. Regarding us, the Croats, it is clear that political differentiation has occurred during the course of war, because the Croats of central Bosnia, Posavina, Herzegovina, and other regions in Bosnia-Herzegovina did not have the same interests, the same destinies in this war. They had different attitudes toward both the allies and the enemies in the war. That has already created stratification," Komsic says.

HDZ Will Maintain Harder Line

About the position of the majority party of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the HDZ, Komsic says:

"Judging by what is going on in the HDZ, they will maintain the hard, I would even say the war line. Take a look at the presidents of the HDZ, who have followed, one after another, since Boban. They were all, in fact, Mate Boban's team, the people who participated directly in the war with Bosnia-Herzegovina. With that hard line, the HDZ will certainly provoke the stratification of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats."

However, Komsic points to something that is often, as he says, neglected when Bosnia-Herzegovina is in question:

"Which political option will win within each nation will depend on which politics will be winning among the other two nations. Because, we must not forget that if there is no stratification within the Serb nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina — and that means a strong, definite political stratification — this will certainly cause a political homogenization within the Muslim nation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that will certainly lead to a political homogenization also among the Croats, and then some of the differences that I have been talking about could disappear."

About a wide coalition of democratic forces that would confront those with a sign of national exlusivism, Komsic says that one could expect that in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but...

"We must know that there is almost no pluralism on the territory of the Serb entity of the Serb Republic. That is an area that was determined by a single nation after the ethnic cleansing that they carried out, and political stratification will hardly occur there. If political stratification occurred there, then one coalition could perhaps be formed in the whole region. A strong alliance or movement for the renewal of Bosnia-Herzegovina could appear, and it could, perhaps, have a chance. Thus, we will always be dependent upon what will happen on the Serb political stage," Komsic says.

Talking about the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Zlatko Lagumdzija says that, in reality, there is a system that was governed by a fascist regime during the war, and that, in the administrative and political sense, an anti-civilizational, intolerant, exclusive, and utterly chauvinist structure has been created.

"We have an opportunity to see a traditional scheme of interconnecting vessels, the strength of democratic forces in one entity will help the democratic forces in another entity and, vice- versa, if the forces of exclusivism, division, and intolerance have strong positions in one entity, then they, by their nature, will inspire the same forces in the other entity, because the people, looking for protection against foreign radicals, will ask their own radicals for help. Often those two structures, not only unconsciously, generate each other (there are examples of that in areas outside of Bosnia-Herzegovina, too). So, the stronger the democratic forces in the Federation will grow, the more the fascist structure that exists in the other entity will disintegrate," Lagumdzija says.

Cooperation With the Serb Democratic Alternative

Sejfudin Tokic says that his party, as early as the start of the crisis in former Yugoslavia, realized that the normalization of life in Bosnia-Herzegovina was associated closely with not only the whole of its territory, but also with the democracy in the neighboring countries — Croatia and Serbia.

"Therefore, throughout the war, we developed a wide spectrum of cooperation with the civic initiatives and political parties that had the same or similar attitudes regarding the solution of the political and military crisis in this area and particularly with the representatives of the emergent democratic alternative on the territories of the Serb entity in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In really difficult circumstances, during the war, on a couple of occasions, we held official meetings with them, and, through the declarations we adopted in Perugia, in a certain way, we anticipated the Dayton agreement. The communications we have with the representatives of the democratic alternative from the territory of the Serb entity today are with a group of independent deputies lead by Milorad Dodik, which has also formed the party of Independent Social Democrats, and the UBSD has signed a protocol on cooperation with Dodik's party. We also have contact with Miodrag Zivanovic, president of the Liberal Party, and Mladen Milanic, who is the leader of the civic initiative, that is, the association of the intellectuals, which are primarily active in Banja Luka. At this moment, in a certain way, those personalities represent the skeleton of a true alternative to Karadzic's regime, which will not easily give up its privileges and all that it has acquired through war, crime, and evil deeds.

"Soon, we will have the first meeting on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and we consider that it will be a significant turning point in the communications and activity of the democratic alternative. At that meeting, which will take place in Sarajevo, with the assistance of Carl Bildt, we will form a board of mutual trust among nations that will be outside of party and political frameworks. This will consist of distinguished people who, by their behavior during the war, acquired references that, in the coming time, will enable them to act successfully against what has been dominant so far — the creation of hatred among nations. These will be people who can contribute significantly to the reestablishment of mutual trust among nations, which is the basis for stability and an opportunity for this cease-fire to grow into a peace. Peace implies the restoration of mutual confidence, the punishment of the war criminals, the creation of the conditions for the return of the refugees, and so on. And all that can, of course, be done with other people, with those people who were not the leaders of the processes that contributed to the unprecedented crimes in the more recent history of Europe," Tokic says.

Smith's Stick and Bildt's Carrot

Although skeptical about the role of the international community in the democratization of Bosnia-Herzegovina (I am afraid of their passivity, of their mission being more observant than active), Ivo Komsic points out that the elections are a chance for the international community to become involved in the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina with political means and not just military means, to clearly and resolutely stand on the side of the democratic forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and to take a determined stance against the military and political oligarchies of the warlords.

Zlatko Lagumdzija thinks that the democratization of Bosnia-Herzegovina depends primarily on concrete activities of the international community.

"They like to present a stick and carrot. There is a stick in the shape of Leighton Smith, with IFOR [Implementation Force] behind him, and there is a carrot in the shape of Carl Bildt and his people, with Bildt sitting on $5 billion. The extent to which we will all have a chance depends on the extent to which those two mechanisms will function, both repressively and, on the other side, positively for the awakening of those democratic forces in the other entity. In other words, I can say that there are people of democratic orientation in the Serb entity, but they simply do not live in an environment in which they can express themselves as such," Lagumdzija says.

Talking about the prospects of social democracy, Lagumdzija says that it is, in the most literal sense of the word, a worldwide category, continuing to say that "in the wider region of former Yugoslavia, there are parties that claim to be worldwide, but can only associate themselves with their branches among the diaspora."

"I believe that, in the time of peace that I hope lies before us, the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, after a collective and individual sobering up from nationalism, political euphoria, and the kind of madness that some of us entered into to a lesser or greater degree, is an area in which the conflict with reality can be solved only by one political program based upon the principles of social democracy. In a country that has been destroyed and in which misery is the dominant way of life, the social democratic way of facing reality is something that really has a big future. It is hard to tell to what extent it will happen in these elections, because the conditions under which the elections will be held have not yet been cleared up — whether they will really be fair, free, and democratic," Lagumdzija says.

Tuzla — Example for Bosnia-Herzegovina

Tokic's party, the UBSD, is in power in Tuzla, which, during the war, succeeded in withstanding intolerance and exclusionism of any kind. The example of Tuzla will certainly be an important electoral trump card for the Bosnian democratic alternative.

"The survival of Tuzla when it was under pressure from Karadzic's shells, but also under pressure from the HDZ and, particularly, SDA media and propaganda, makes it possible for one to base the whole process of reintegration and the restoration of mutual confidence among nations upon that Tuzla model of understanding and successful functioning of the rule-of-law in the civil sphere and even in the economic activities. That is a model that, in a certain way, bears witness to the facts that the war did not need to have such repercussions and that the goals of the homogenization and territorialization of nations could not succeed where there were multinational stable political structures of authority, that is, where there was no prevailing logic of totalitarianism in which one nation was represented by one party and one leader," Tokic says.

He also says that there are indications that the Serb Civic Council in Sarajevo could transform itself into a party, and that there could once again be a coalition of national parties, as in 1990, but also that the electorate remembers the fraud when the national leaders had their photographs taken together and when they tied flags together.

"I think that the people are aware of that fraud and that this awareness has, in a certain way, been dominant in the expressed anti-war feeling that contributed to the implementation of the Dayton agreement regarding the cease-fire. I also think that the anti-war feeling is far more present among the common citizens, regardless of which part of the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina they live in, than among the ruling national oligarchies," Tokic says.

The elections will show the political will of the Bosnia-Herzegovina citizens. The parties will struggle for power, but that is not the only goal. Talking about the "first post-war elections," SDP Vice President Zlatko Lagumdzija, says:

"My goals are that, after those 'first elections,' the second elections will take place, and many more after those, and that the word 'post-war' will become something behind us, something that will no longer be used."

B-H: Kapetanovic: Privatization Key for Economy

AU3001133496 Sarajevo LJILJAN in Serbo-Croatian 24 Jan 96 pp 5-6

[Interview with Izudin Kapetanovic, new prime minister of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, by Nedzad Latic; place and date not given: "My Dream Is Bosnia Without Big Smokestacks and Without Myths About the Spade of Alija Sirotanovic"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Izudin Kapetanovic was born in September 1953 in Tuzla. He graduated from the Electric Technical Faculty in Sarajevo, and obtained his doctorate at the Electrical Engineering Faculty in Tuzla. He went to Germany for post-doctorate study for two years. He was elected a lecturer, and then a dean in 1988. He speaks German and English. He is married, and lives with his family in Tuzla.

[Latic] When did you join the Party of Democratic Action [SDA]?

[Kapetanovic] At the beginning of 1992.

[Latic] Were you politically active before that?

[Kapetanovic] As a teacher and as dean of a faculty I was in the former party [Communist Party of Yugoslavia]. When it disintegrated, I remained politically neutral. My colleagues became candidates on the electoral lists of the Social Democrat Party [SDP], and I remained under the cover of their phrase of professionalism and political neutralism. Being a man with no political ambitions, that suited me, before the aggression started. Then I realized that in order to contribute to the defense of the people and of the state I had to become politically active, and I could realize my engagement best through the SDA. This party corresponded my patriotic and national feelings. The whole family voted for the SDA.

[Latic] When did you become a member of the SDA Executive Board?

[Kapetanovic] Two years ago.

[Latic] Did you have political ambitions then?

[Kapetanovic] No. All that I have achieved in my life was accomplished before I became active in the SDA. I mean the posts I have held before this one.

[Latic] What about the congratulations from Prime Minister Silajdzic?

[Kapetanovic] After I was appointed, I left Sarajevo, and I do not know who exactly expressed their congratulations to me. When I return to Sarajevo, I will see.

[Latic] Where you surprised with the candidature?

[Kapetanovic] After Silajdzic offered his resignation in Zenica, my name appeared among the names on the list for the office of prime minister. I was surprised. I was surprised by the confidence the party showed in me. I would say that I was already prepared then, so that this time I was not particularly surprised.

[Latic] How do you define the office of prime minister at this time, with regard to the problems in the Federation? Do you believe that this office is of crucial significance for the future of the country?

[Kapetanovic] I would accept a post of a much lower rank if I felt that I could do much more for my people in that post. I believe that at this time there is no more difficult post than this one, because it requires capitalization of everything that the people have suffered for and for which they have paid the highest possible price. The fight for peace and justice, the fight for prosperity and for the economic foundations of the state, the fight for the democratic ideals of our people, will for the most part lie on the shoulders of this post. And I have to fulfill this task, together with my colleagues.

[Latic] What is the relationship between the ministries of the republican and federal governments?

[Kapetanovic] The number of ministries does not necessarily indicate which government is more important. Simply, that is the way political talks have gone. We have achieved these solutions, and I see them as the best possible solutions at this moment. If better solutions could have been achieved, they would certainly have been achieved from our side. The relationship between the ministries is conditioned by the Washington Agreement, and that relationship was made precise in the Constitution of the Federation. The current position is such that we will remain in the ministries that already existed in the Government of the Republic/Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina [sentence as published]. Some ministries will be conditioned by appointing ministers in the government of the Republic. It was agreed that, for example, if the minister of finances in the government of the Republic is a Croat, then in the government of the Federation it should be a Bosniak. Because the Ministry of Finances exists in both governments. That also indicates the conditioned synchronization of the governments. We have to work together, even if our responsibilities lie on different levels.

[Latic] When will you announce the names of the candidates?

[Kapetanovic] At the end of the week. I was in Tuzla for two days. Today in Zenica I have had talks with the representatives of the SDA, with assembly delegates, and with the candidates. I will then be going to Travnik, Bugojno, Konjic, Mostar, and Bihac. After this I will return to Sarajevo, where I will have final consultations.

[Latic] What about the names from the Croatian Democratic Community [HDZ]?

[Kapetanovic] They will be known at the end of the week.

[Latic] Will you prolong the deadlines for the Constitution of the government?

[Kapetanovic] There is nothing disputable that could prevent the forming of the government in the announced time. But the problem of the Bosniak side is: Should we include the opposition, and Serbs, among our candidates, in which the HDZ is not interested? They only have candidates from the HDZ.

[Latic] Who will be your deputy?

[Kapetanovic] According to the agreement, the minister of defense. A Croat, of course.

[Latic] Who will be the third prime minister, from the Serb side?

[Kapetanovic] I do not know.

[Latic] What will be the priority of your government?

[Kapetanovic] Who dares promise that he will solve all the problems?! But, a wide front for solving them can be opened. By all means the starting point of the plan is the revival of the economy, which encompasses urgent employment of the families of those who fell for freedom, of invalids, and of soldiers themselves. If we manage to employ up to 150,000 soldiers, there are still 50,000 of them left, who will be professionally engaged in the army and whose salaries must be secured. There is also the social problem of the pensioners, as well as the people employed in education, health, and the judiciary. I have heard that over 600 medical workers have left Zenica. I do not think that Tuzla and Sarajevo have been spared the same process. Everybody should be given material security. At this time there is an obvious process of unselective filling of working places in administrative services. The bureaucratic apparatus has been growing enormously because of the aid parcels and warm meals that employees receive.

[Latic] You already have a "dowry" from the present government?

[Kapetanovic] At the moment I cannot evaluate the work of the present government. I will ask for a report in which I would have a survey of the situation, and that will be my starting point. In the same way my successor will be able to know what I have done. The government has surely had great problems, it has been stretched on several fronts, and, after all, it has worked in war conditions. I have mentioned the problems that are a normal product of the war, I have not spoken about them as the results of the work of the present government. Besides, we have to draw up an inventory.

If we start solving problems partially and move towards a system that will at least create the conditions for some future government to be able to start from better positions, maybe after the elections, that would be a significant step forward. After all, we will fight to create good conditions for work.

[Latic] Some political economists say that it is not the state that builds capital, but rather it is capital that builds the state. In our political context that would mean that — if we do not manage to acquire capital — we will place the existence of the state in question?

[Kapetanovic] As far as I know, one of the objectives of the SDA program is a market economy, which also means the privatization of property. On the other hand, the present time and the popular political and economic trends are such that they even impose such a concept on us. And, after all, the international community has also demanded that of us. I can see no obstructions for us to start on the road of a market economy.

[Latic] On that road, I suppose, there are big economic problems waiting. In the first place, the uncompleted process of shares?

[Kapetanovic] The process of the issuing of shares started before the war. All decisions, up to 31 December 1991, must be reviewed. All that will be subject to revision. We will start with the sort of privatization that will bring money. The experience of Germany, which undertook the restructuring of the economy of East Germany and its reintegration into the economy of the Federal Republic of Germany, could be the basis on which our experts could start restructuring our economy. The Germans formed the Treuhand agency, which managed to find excellent solutions. Through such an agency, we could reach correct solutions, about which we will not have to worry. Privatization must be just and fair; that is the slogan that I would like to stress particularly in this moment. Somebody might remark that those who have money are not here but elsewhere, but the state must create fair banking, which will make credits possible and thus create at least the elementary conditions for creative and capable people, and enable them to start their own businesses in the competition of the free market. The fact that the presidency has approved financial means for the soldiers, is one of the qualitative moves that could be of use in privatization. For example, for the beginning — for the purchase of apartments, then of social institutions and finally of enterprises. That program is by no means simple; it is complex, and my government will protect the soldiers, i.e. their shares, in order to prevent them being sold for nothing. I will make sure that the buying off of those shares and their placement in the privatization of apartments and of the economy be done through controlled state mechanisms. Banks must play a key role in that. Perhaps instead of paper share certificates they should hand out savings books recording the amounts of savings. That is the way I think, and we will accept any better solutions from people who are experts in that field. There is a large number of private companies; I believe those companies exist only on paper. People could register companies for 200 German marks. It does not have to mean that all companies resulted from war-profiteering, there has been disorder but there have also been some good intentions. For example, a soldier gives his last mark to set up of a company in order to try to leave something to his family in this war, and so on. That period is now behind us, regulations will change, registrations will be revised. We must check what sort of companies there are, who registered them. I am in favor of the concept of a large number of small and medium-sized enterprises. Such companies could be organized through certain chamber associations, in the sphere of mutual interest, in the sense of loans, credits. The future of our country lies in small and medium-sized enterprises.

[Latic] How can our currency be made convertible?

[Kapetanovic] The convertibility of every currency rests on several pillars. One is membership in the IMF, another is the capital, which we currently have, the third is the means that we will realize through privatization, and, ultimately, that is our job. We have become a member of the IMF, and the rest is up to us.

[Latic] Is the international community, which is prejudiced against Bosniaks when it comes to democracy, also prejudiced against our orientation to the market economy?

[Kapetanovic] We will certainly be the first state created on the territory of former Yugoslavia that seriously embarks on the road of the market economy. Before the war we were the only republic whose economy had positive results. Our people are clever, industrious, and honest, it is only a matter of good programs.

[Latic] Private property is a sacred thing, and our political philosophy?

[Kapetanovic] By all means, because otherwise we cannot expect the international community to help us bring our people back to Foca, Zvornik, etc. That is the basic political trump card with which we must keep the international community obliged to help us on that way. Private property is sacred all over the world. That political philosophy is excellently understood by our policy.

[Latic] What about the plants controlled by the Croatian Defense Council [HVO]?

[Kapetanovic] They too will be dealt with through the system of privatization. Nobody can consider a plant to be his only because his army has entered it. The solving of that issue will significantly reduce the tensions between us.

[Latic] Carl Bildt claims that the Zenica ironworks should be liquidated.

[Kapetanovic] I have not heard that statement of his, and if he thinks that way on the basis of expert opinions, we will recognize that, but only after the evaluations of our experts.

[Latic] How will you bring the refugees back?

[Kapetanovic] We will make their return of interest to both sides: the state and the citizens. In former Yugoslavia, our workers employed abroad were a basis for development in many areas. I have heard that in the German parliament there was a proposal that every refugee should be given 10,000 German marks to return. While for the time being that is but an isolated proposal, it should be supported and insisted upon in other countries as well. As for the Declaration on Amnesty, one should have in mind that it is an obligation under the Dayton agreement.

[Latic] Which dream does the future prime minister wish to realize?

[Kapetanovic] My first wish is to be successful in the reprivatization of apartments, so that soldiers are accommodated. Then, I would like Bosnia to be enriched with small hydroelectric plants, the owners of which would be known. My biggest dream is for big smokestacks to disappear from Bosnia, and instead to have countless small factories that would not exploit our people so much. I am fed up with calculations about millions of tons of coal, millions of megawatts, tons of acid in Polihem [chemical plant], I am fed up with the myth of Alija Sirotanovic [coal miner, communist hero of the postwar time]. Why should we not make factories for making electronic chips in?

B-H: Sacirbegovic Worried Over Federation's Strength

BR3001161596 Oslo ARBEIDERBLADET in Norwegian 30 Jan 96 p 12

[Report on interview with Bosnian Foreign Minister Mohamed Sacirbegovic by Elisabeth Salvesen in Sarajevo; no date given: "Worried About the Federation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo — "It worries me that many people are so concerned about our severed finger that they do not see that the arm itself is hanging dangling," Bosnian Foreign Minister Mohamed Sacirbegovic said.

By saying this he wanted to direct attention toward the Muslim-Croatian Federation and away from the Serb Republic in Bosnia.

"I have offered to resign as foreign minister so that a Croat can take over my post and help to strengthen the Muslim-Croat Federation on which the whole peace agreement for Bosnia is based," Mohamed Sacirbegovic told ARBEIDERBLADET.

Much Remains

"Regardless of all the agreements which have been entered into on the Federation, most recently in Dayton in November, there remains in practice a very great deal before the Federation can be called a success. The day that that happens I can resign as foreign minister with a light heart."

Political observers in Sarajevo expect that if this happens Sacirbegovic will have a central position in the reconstruction of the country. A lawyer, leading businessman, and banker, Mohamed Sacirbegovic became foreign minister of Bosnia in June last year after being Bosnia-Herzegovina's UN ambassador since the United Nations recognized the state in May 1992. He then returned to his homeland after living in the United States for almost 30 years, and is now being criticized by his political opponents because he speaks much better American than his own mother tongue.

Others are worried that he — someone who has lived so long abroad — will not perhaps succeed in picking up on all the undercurrents in Bosnian politics which will become more visible as the peace begins to look as if it will last.

Wheels in Motion

"As things progress I would probably be more useful taking part in the reconstruction of Bosnia in private industry," Sacirbegovic said reflectively.

"What is important now is to get the wheels in motion and seize the opportunity while the United States and the whole of the Western world is showing interest. Bosnia should be a profitable place for investment now, with an unlimited number of reconstruction tasks and a highly educated labor force that is not exactly very used to high wages.

"However, I do not see before me a strong state. Here a Scandinavian social democratic model could be interesting, bearing in mind the need to build up a welfare state and help the many who have been damaged for life in the war. But if I am to be realistic, this possibility is probably effectively ruled out by the limited economic resources which the war-crippled Bosnian state has at its disposal," Sacirbegovic said.

Looks to the West

The foreign minister is not worried by the fact that the NATO force will only be in Bosnia for one year. He expects that if many of the NATO soldiers are withdrawn then a sufficient number will remain in the country to guarantee the peace together with what he calls the "other necessary foreign presence."

"This year must be used to integrate Bosnia into the Western world," Mohamed Sacirbegovic said.

"We must build a multicultural democracy based on a market economy, and we have received interesting signals about possible links with NATO under the Partnership for Peace arrangement."

Will Take Time

As far as the internal integration between the Federation and the Serb Republic in Bosnia is concerned, Sacirbegovic stressed that it will probably take time, and much will depend on politicians coming forward in the Serb Republic who take a different view of the reunification of Bosnia than Karadzic and his supporters in the "Pale group."

B-H: Political 'Shifts' Among Pale Serbs Noted

AU3001200696 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The first shifts from one party to another have been registered in the Serb entity before the announced elections, mostly to the detriment of the ruling Serb Democratic Party.

Andjelko Grahovac, former deputy in the Pale assembly and one of the founders of this party in Banja Luka, recently became deputy chairman of the newly formed Party of Independent Social Democrats led by independent deputy Milorad Dodik.

B-H: Serbs Set 4 Feb for Sarajevo 'Evacuation'

AU3001151296 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 27 Jan 96 p 4

["Exclusive" report by Mirjana Kusmuk: "The Exodus Will Begin on 4 February"]

[FBIS Translated Text] VESTI has learned that 4 February has been designated "D-Day," that is, the day for the evacuation of Serb Sarajevo, namely, the same day by which, in keeping with the Dayton agreement, all armed forces of the Serb Republic should withdraw from the Serb parts of the city.

According to the plan obtained by VESTI, the residents of Vogosca should settle in Visegrad, the residents of Ilijas in Milici and Bratunac, the residents of Ilidza in Lukavica, Kasindol, Trnovo, and Srbinje [Foca], and the residents of Novo Sarajevo will move to those parts of the municipality that will remain in the Serb Republic, that is, villages at the foot of Mt. Trebevic, while the residents of Stari Grad Municipality should move to Pale. The concept of the plan is to keep the residents of Serb Sarajevo in the region of Romanija and Pirac.

The plan, drafted by the Ministry for Expelled and Displaced Persons, was supposed to be discussed by the Serb Republic Government yesterday. The evacuation of Serb Sarajevo residents envisages two phases: the first from 20 January to 4 February, and the second from 4 February to 20 March, when Serb Sarajevo is to become part of the Croatian-Muslim federation. The plan states that the educational structure of the population and locations to which industrial installations will be moved from the city will be taken into consideration during the relocation of Serb Sarajevo. Yesterday, the ministers were supposed to review a plan of measures and activities pertaining to the implementation of the peace plan and the working plan of the Ministry for Expelled and Displaced Persons regarding the implementation of Annex 7 of the Dayton agreement on repatriation.

B-H: Bosnian Serb Speaker Meets With U.S. Envoy

LD3001145396 Belgrade SRNA in Serbo-Croatian 1336 GMT 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Sarajevo, 30 Jan (SRNA) — Momcilo Krajisnik, speaker of the People's Assembly of the [Bosnian] Serb Republic, held talks in Pale today with John Menzies, U.S. ambassador to Sarajevo, on the release of remaining prisoners, the problem of Serb Sarajevo, and the lifting of sanctions against the Serb Republic.

After the meeting, Krajisnik said that he asked the U.S. ambassador to speed up the process of releasing the remaining Serb prisoners who are being held in Muslim and Croat prisons, noting that "there should not be any major problems with the Croats."

"Menzies promised that we will receive an urgent reply on this issue and that a separate meeting will be arranged to discuss the release of the remaining imprisoned Serbs," Krajisnik added.

He said that he also discussed with Menzies the problem of Serb Sarajevo and the forthcoming meeting of a city delegation of Serbs with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, who is due to visit Sarajevo shortly.

"We have agreed to the meeting with Christopher and to the meeting taking place in the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo, where the representatives of our part of the city will put forward some of their proposals for the solution to this problem," the speaker of the Serb Republic Assembly said.

Krajisnik also said that he received an assurance from Menzies that it is only for "technical reasons" that sanctions against the Serb Republic have not been lifted and that the response to this issue will be known as early as 1 February.

According to the speaker of the Serb Republic parliament, they also discussed problems of the supply of electricity throughout the Banja Luka region and Gorazde and the Vogosca-Sumbulovac road and the corridor through Posavina.

Croatia: UNTAES General, Slavonia Serbs Hold Talks

AU3101120296 Beli Manastir Srpski Radio in Serbo-Croatian 1700 GMT 30 Jan 96

[Unattributed report]

[FBIS Translated Text] Today Milan Milanovic, head of the Srem-Baranja District negotiating team, and Major General Dusan Loncar, commander of the Slavonia-Baranja Corps, met with Belgian General Josef Shoups, future commander of UNTAES [United Nations Transition Administration for Eastern Slavonia] military component. Since he has not yet been officially appointed commander of military personnel in charge of keeping peace and implementing the Erdut Agreement, Gen. Shoups did not want to make any statement, but he did say that he would probably assume command late in February.

After the meeting, Gen. Dusan Loncar, commander of our units, said that the meeting with Gen. Shoups concentrated mainly on demilitarization matters.

Milan Milanovic reiterated that, as things stand now, along with Russian and Belgian battalions as military effectives, Indonesian and Pakistani battalions will also be deployed in the Srem-Baranja District, while it is still not certain whether a Ukrainian helicopter unit will come to the region. Milanovic pointed out that, after today's meeting with Gen. Shoups, it is certain that the UN headquarters in Zagreb will close completely and that all its staff will be transferred to Vukovar. Milanovic added that, for technical reasons, this change will most probably take place in April or May. Until then the UN Administration will be located in Erdut.

Croatia: Resettlement of Serbs in E. Slavonia Pledged

AU3001214196 Beli Manastir Radio Televizija Republike Srpske Krajine in Serbo-Croatian 2000 GMT 29 Jan 96

[Unattributed report]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Today's visit of the Vrbas, Kula, Apatin, and Sombor municipal assembly chairmen to Beli Manastir, pledging to do their best to pave the way for the realization of the plan to settle permanently at least another 5,000 Serbs in the Baranja area over the next two to three months, shows that the program for the settlement of refugees from western parts of Krajina presently living in Yugoslavia is not just a pipe dream but is slowly being carried out. At a meeting with Beli Manastir municipality officials, the guests from Vrbas, Kula, Apatin, and Sombor expressed their willingness for full cooperation. It was agreed that municipalities that are currently accommodating some 30,000 refugees from western Slavonia, Banija, Kordun, Lika, and northern Dalmatia should organize meetings with the refugees to present all possibilities offered by the settlement program. [passage omitted]

At the meeting with their hosts in Beli Manastir, the guests from Vrbas, Kula, Apatin, and Sombor also expressed their readiness to give financial assistance to the plan to settle Baranja. Furthermore, more versatile and closer business and economic ties between their municipalities and local firms were also announced.

Croatia: HSP Criticizes Slavonia Demobilization

AU3101120096 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 28 Jan 96 p 5

[Report by D.K.: "If Need Be, the Croatian Party of Right Will Again Go Into the Trenches"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Osijek—A rally and public panel discussion organized by the Ante Paradzik subsidiary of the Croatian Party of Right [HSP] was held on Saturday in the halls of the Student Center in Osijek. The central event was the speech made by HSP Vice President Ante Djapic.

Djapic warned that, currently, "numerous foreign military teams are cruising Croatia, yet surprisingly, we are decreasing the budget funds earmarked for the Defense Ministry at precisely such a moment." "Moreover, we are well meaning in our warning to the leadership that demobilization in Slavonia is not a good idea. Why? Because no one has come up with a program of how to absorb tens of thousands of people who have spent all this time in uniform and who defended and cared for Croatia. Demobilization is actually an act of demoralization. Why the increase in police and funds for the police? Perhaps to calm those who will fill the streets after demobilization?" Djapic asked.

Frequently cut short by the applause of about 100 assembled members and supporters, Djapic addressed the future of rightist [pravastvo] policy. "The HSP does not wish to confront other parties, but we also do not want to participate in an uncompromising struggle for power. We have to think of human beings, our disabled, and the families of the killed, rather than dabble in high politics. Heretofore, we have been the charging saber of others, we went into trenches while the others simply exchanged their [Communist] party membership cards for new ones, bought up Croatian factories cheaply, and became businessmen. Tomorrow, when peaceful reintegration fails, we shall surely again be the ones who will go into trenches because Croatia is our priority. The others will again simply wait. That is why, in the future, the HSP must show that it will politics. [sentence as published]

Let us don sheepskins, but let us also remain old Ustasha wolves, Djapic concluded.

Croatia: Serbs Said Selling Videotapes of Rapes

AU3101101696 Zagreb VECERNJI LIST in Serbo-Croatian 29 Jan 96 p 32

[Report by Sandra Mes: "Evidence for the The Hague War Crimes Tribunal"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Videotapes showing Serb criminal rape of women in Bosnia have also appeared in the Netherlands. They are sold for a sum of 1,000 German marks. The Dutch were horrified by the Chetnik's entrepreneurial ability to make money from crimes committed against innocent girls, women, and men. According to the high circulation DE TELEGRAAF, the so-called Yugotapes contain footage of cruel sexual abuse of young women that ends in the victims' murder.

The Justice Ministry has announced a serious investigation into this Serb activity, while the International War Crimes Tribunal for crimes committed in former Yugoslavia will use the tapes of "criminal orgies" as evidence against the perpetrators, that is, "Yugoslav soldiers."

The owner of the video rental store who alerted the Amsterdam paper and told them about the offer of "Yugoslav sex films," said that he was used to all sorts of brutality in orgies. However, when he saw the contents of the "Yugo merchandise," he said: "I thought I would go out of my mind."

In a country in Europe that notoriously takes the lead in all types of vice—from drugs and "white slavery" to the profitable sex industry—the horrors of the Chetnik orgies "in the Balkans" surpass all ability to understand such depravity of mind, the public claims.

Croatia: Izetbegovic's Criticism of Croats Rejected

AU2901155696 Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 26 Jan 96 p 5

[Article by Alenko Zornija: "Izetbegovic's Untrue Accusations"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The interview with the president of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina broadcast on the state television network on Monday [22 January] confirmed that his statements at last year's session of the SDA [Party of Democratic Action] Executive Board, as well as the official formulation of the recent proposal of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina to adopt the Amnesty Law, which embittered the Bosnian Croats, were not incidental. In both cases, the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] units that participated in the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina and—particularly with the most recent military successes, supported by the forces from Croatia—made the Dayton agreement possible, are placed on the same level as the Serb forces that committed the aggression against Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, unlike those two cases, when "Croat and Serb paramilitary formations" and "Boban's HVO and Karadzic's SDS [Serb Democratic Party]" were compared, this time President Izetbegovic directly accused the HVO of harming the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Responding to Ivan Bender's recent statement in the Assembly, in which Bender reminded the representatives of the HVO's contribution to the defense of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Sarajevo, Izetbegovic completely denied that contribution and stated: "Had it not been for the HVO, our Army would now be on the Drina River."

In general, in his most recent appearance, Izetbegovic was full of bitterness toward Bosnia-Herzegovina Croats, that is, toward their political representatives. Although his appearance on television was mainly intended to explain to the anxious nation the essence of the conflict between the SDA and Haris Silajdzic, in which he seriously accused the resigning prime minister (the prime minister has not been given an opportunity to explain his position on state television), a good deal of the president's answers referred to allegedly incorrect Croat behavior in the establishment of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In this context, he paid particular attention to events in Mostar, where, in his words, basic religious freedoms are forbidden. "There is no such place in the world," he said.

Izetbegovic did not spare the current Croatian leadership, singling out opposition leaders Mesic and Manolic, some Croatian intellectuals, and the Catholic Church leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as "the honest Croats."

He said that the Bosniaks had agreed on the Croats entering the republican government only in order to extend the authorities of the Federal Government, because, as he said, "if Croats only rule the area they control, we do not need them in the authorities in the area under the control of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina." Although what he said corresponds to the political reality, this statement is important because, as it seems, the Sarajevo government has thrown off its mask of alleged multiethnicity, and of the propaganda claims that the authority in the part of Bosnia-Herzegovina under Muslim control differs from the one established in other parts of the country.

Thus Izetbegovic confronted his own statements in the same interview, otherwise also full of inconsistencies. Even if what Izetbegovic said about Croatian behavior were true in general, it strikes one that he did not mention at all the serious violations of non-Bosniaks', particularly Croats', human rights in the territory under the control of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. The reports of impartial international observers confirm that human rights were seriously violated in both housing policy, employment policy, and elsewhere.

Apart from that, if the situation in the territories of the Federation under the control of the Croats is such as seen by President Izetbegovic, would there be such a huge disproportion between the Croats who, after the Washington treaty, left "Bosniak" territories, and the Bosniaks who left "Croat" territories? Even in the "notorious" western Mostar, the number of Bosniaks is almost one hundred times bigger than the number of Croats in the "democratic," eastern part of the town. However, the president of the Presidency did not talk about that to the audience of Sarajevo Television. Instead, as a reason for new accusations against the Croats, he took one western Mostar TV station broadcast that was also broadcast in Sarajevo as an example of "Croat intolerance." Izetbegovic raised that local broadcast almost to the level of a matter of state, claiming that this explained "why things in the Federation did not work." However, he again forgot to mention the events on the same, local level, only in the eastern part of the town. Namely, the local Croatian TV has a counterpart in Mostar in the Muslim radio and TV studio, which has on many occasions vulgarly offended Croat and Catholic symbols. Of course, even the protest of President Zubak of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina at such behavior of the TV station from the Muslim part of Mostar was not a good enough reason for Izetbegovic to speak up, but he spoke up with pleasure when the "culprits" were the Croats!

However, perhaps the reason that "things in the Federation do not work" is to be found in precisely such a selective definition of "guilt." Accusing the Croats exclusively of all the problems, without any self-criticism, is not, of course, the way to move the joint Croat-Bosniak project forward.

The Federation is a common interest but also the interest of the international community. And regardless of, perhaps, certain points that Izetbegovic gained among a part of the Bosniak public by this appearance—which is probably very important to him, regarding the "Silajdzic case"—it could very soon prove that the political points, won in that manner, pay only in the short term.

FYROM: Belgrade-Skopje Mutual Recognition Viewed

AU3101105596 Skopje MIC in English 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] The recognition between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM], which, according to many announcements, should have taken place yesterday, has been postponed.

Yesterday, the Yugoslav news agency TANJUG broadcast the announcement of the Yugoslav Government, according to which it "has determined the draft-text of the agreement on the normalization of relations between Belgrade and Skopje." According to the announcement, "the time and date of the signing of the agreement will be additionally set."

This news from Belgrade was received with a great dose of surprise in the Macedonian Foreign Ministry, mostly because of the use of the terms "Belgrade" and "Skopje," which points to the intentional evasion to use the name of our state. This language equilibria in the announcement from Belgrade is interpreted in Skopje as certain backing down on the part of the Yugoslav Government, following the talks in Athens between the Yugoslav Foreign Minister Milan Milutinovic and his Greek colleague Teodoros Pangalos, in Athens on Sunday.

The surprise was even greater seeing it was agreed in the contacts between the Macedonian and Yugoslav foreign ministry for both sides to announce their moves in coordination. It was also agreed for the text of the agreement on normalization of relations to be signed by the foreign ministers of the two countries, in Skopje.

Yesterday's event seems to be making a certain turn in the negotiations between FR [Federal Republic of] Yugoslavia and Macedonia. Notably, well-informed sources in the Macedonian Foreign Ministry claimed yesterday that the question of the name had never been controversial previously and therefore, it had never been discussed in contacts between representatives of the two ministries. Even President Milosevic had not made any problems about the name under which Belgrade would recognize Macedonia, during his last meeting with President Kiro Gligorov, on 2 October last year. The text that has been coordinated in the to-date preliminary talks applies to the normalization of relations between FR Yugoslavia and the Republic of Macedonia.

The only controversial question in the negotiations related to the preparation of this agreement was the question of continuity of the former SFRY [Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia]. We have learned that some formulas that suit both sides have been, according to which FR Yugoslavia recognizes the Macedonian people the right to their own state, and their struggle in history for the formation of the Republic of Macedonia, while Macedonia promises not make any obstacles for the legal continuity of FR Yugoslavia, with the former SFRY and the old Kingdom of Yugoslavia. In this sense, in exchange for the recognition of the continuity, Macedonia is prepared not to obstruct FRY in its membership in the international organizations in which SFRY used to be a member.

This will be quite an unusual form of document, that will be based on the mutual recognition of the two independent states. The text is considerably long and beside mentioning the mutual recognition and the establishment of full diplomatic relations, it also mentions other matters, from the recognition of the mutual border, to the perspectives for economic cooperation, which is precisely why it is named "Agreement on the normalization of relations between FR Yugoslavia and the Republic of Macedonia."

FYROM: FRY's 'Linguistic Acrobatics' Criticized

AU3001151596 Paris AFP in English
1419 GMT 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Skopje, Jan 30 (AFP)—Yugoslavia's tentative announcement of plans to recognise Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] met with scepticism in the Macedonian capital Tuesday at what was seen as delaying tactics on recognition under pressure from Greece.

A newspaper close to the Macedonian government reflected official surprise that rump Yugoslavia [Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, FRY] had not produced a simple recognition statement.

A cautiously worded statement from Belgrade Monday on an "outline agreement" is being seen by observers in Belgrade as a kind of letter of intent on normalising relations.

The Skopje newspaper VECER wrote: "The news was received with surprise in the Macedonian Foreign Ministry, especially at the absence of the name Macedonia in the statement."

Monday's Yugoslav statement carefully avoided mentioning Macedonia by name in order not to offend Belgrade's friend Greece, which disputes the state's right to this name. The statement said Belgrade would fix a date later for the signing of a recognition accord.

Athens has long claimed that the very existence of Macedonia, which carries the same name as a Greek province, as well as its constitution and national symbols, are evidence of its intention to expand its territory at Greece's expense.

VECER said the "linguistic acrobatics" of the statement represented a U-turn by Belgrade after talks between the Yugoslav foreign minister Milan Milutinovic and his Greek counterpart Theodor Pangalos.

It said there was particular surprise because Belgrade and Skopje had previously agreed to announce mutual recognition simultaneously and hold a signing ceremony in Skopje on diplomatic ties.

FYROM: Commentary Warns Against 'Ethnic Divisions'

AU2901115696 Skopje PULS in Macedonian 26 Jan 96 pp 18-19

[Commentary by Mirce Tomovski: "A Taste of Segregation"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The time in which we are living will probably be remembered for the politicization of the overall Macedonian social atmosphere. In a way, it also represents a spontaneity of processes in which ideas are linked and history changed. However, it is in itself calamitous for the multidimensionality, the vastness, the originality, for the purpose of the changes that have been initiated by big ideas. Its pressure cannot be endured by the state structures, business, the intellectuals.... The consequences are the idleness of the transmitted energy, the energy that gives rise to hopelessness, particularly because it is associated with personal profile, ambitions, individual positions, and personal interests.

In Macedonian practice, the ethnic domain is the most attractive for politicization and political commerce. Although it was considered old-fashioned, the politicization of the national feeling and its structure is slowly emerging from the Macedonian democratic ambience. Perhaps it is an attempt to maintain the collapse of the spiritual structures of all nationalisms in Macedonia [The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia—FYROM] by emphasizing "one's own" and thus provoking the "other's" nationalism.

"The high" protection of the Macedonian nation arises because of the "concern" with the activities of the current ruling policy. On the foreign level, the "danger" comes from the sell-out of the Macedonian national identity—the flag, the name—and on the domestic level, it is the "endangered" nationalities. They manifest their "heroism before their own kind" by creating divisions, apportionments, constant "discoveries" of particularities, and theses for parallel political systems, cultures, and education, as far as one's own nation and state. The approach is different. It ranges from speeches "on behalf of the people" to the deployment of intellectuals, ministers, and members of parliament with their ardent addresses in parliament, party and ideological peaks, the ideologization of literature, and even the unusual engagement of foreign professional diplomats.

The VMRO-DPMNE [Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization-Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity] has been quiet for a long time. It is doing so just at the time when huge steps are being made in the state for the establishment of the political system and the economy, when the civic project is being shaped, when important laws are being adopted—such as the law on denationalization—when changes related to privatization are at a peak, when debates on the future development are underway, when Macedonia as an international subject is finding its place in international structures.... In this political landscape, the highest body of the VMRO-DPMNE addressed the public recently to inform it that "it does not accept the New York Macedonian-Greek Accord, the change of the name...," which is a well-known Macedonian national fairy tale. At the same time, it states that the United Nations and other international organizations and forums will be informed about this. Normally, nobody can be prevented from adhering to Macedonian national traditions, and particularly not from presenting such initiatives in the Constitutional Court, where the VMRO-DPMNE presented these problems. It is difficult to understand the persistence, especially when one knows what is actually being done. They are forcefully and continually presenting the thesis about the alleged change of the name of the state and complaining abroad about the state in which they live. However, the the right to illusions remains, even after the events which took place in Dayton.

The latest developments regarding the Association of Macedonia's Writers [DPM], in spite of the real problems that were raised by a large group of its members, have pushed the writers of Turkish origin into political games of a national character. It would certainly not be heretical if the writers of this nationality had found a way to express their problems within the DPM. Nevertheless, it is absurd that the Turkish writers should form a separate association simply because they were not satisfied with the work of DPM President Jovan Pavlovski.

The right to search for and evaluate one's own national identity is legitimate. Within these frameworks, the particularities and challenges of division are extremely attractive. It is even more difficult to understand all this knowing that the initiative came from Ilhami Emin (an outstanding writer of Turkish nationality, who has published a large number of collections of poetry in Turkish, as well as translations in Macedonian; who is a respected person at the head of the Turkish intellectuals; who takes part in many engagements; who is a journalist, a former high-ranking government official in the field of culture, Tito's and Gligorov's official interpreter for Turkish, DPM secretary, and the manager of the Theater of the Nationalities who introduced simultaneous translation in order to experience performances regardless of the language used with the goal of fostering artistic understanding...). He is a man who is opposed to hermetic creativity. His arguments about the particularity of the literary act, his introverted personality, his sensibility as a creator in general, and the strength of his language are beyond dispute. However, it is exactly in this area that the temptations of the mission of the intellectual, of the creator, lie. In order to avoid the trap of suppressed creativity, one enters the trap of national division and ghettoization.

A group of writers expressed its dissatisfaction with the Association of Independent Writers. This is, for instance, the place that provides possibilities for seeking solutions to the dissatisfaction that is given as the reason for the formation of an association of writers of Turkish nationality. Within the framework of the independent writers, there is a symbolic presence of their colleagues of other nationalities. The DPM itself can also be an alternative, provided some changes are made, and a more flexible organization can help overcome the problems of all writers in Macedonia, regardless of the language they write in or the nationality they belong to. The divisions among writers, based on the written word, demonstrate the politicization of a sensitive zone such as creativity. This shows two faces of the same nonsense. To force ethnic divisions means to enter the zone of policy. To be closed hermetically within "one's own" language, in "one's own" national group, cuts off the most vital part of creativity—communication with the public, communication in which high aesthetic standards and the universal values will be met. The representatives of some Albanian national parties started the year by "bowing" to Tirana, which in itself is normal. Problems arise when these discussions and contacts produce solutions to some delicate questions in Macedonia, especially regarding the language, the treatment of the Albanian nationality as a nation, education, and so on. This is, nevertheless, an obligation of the Macedonian state, whose citizens and members are of Albanian nationality. This is not just an irritation in the whole complex of interethnic relations, but also a remarkable sign of the loss of political individuality of these parties. The place for the Albanian representatives' ideas and reality is the Macedonian space in which they live. This confinement of ideas and their treatment as reality or simply their creation is also to be found among the Vlach party leaders, the parties of the Serbs in Macedonia...

One event that was reported recently is quite interesting. Its is controversial, judging by the public announcements, and it remains hanging in the air. It was the visit by U.S. representative Comras to Tetovo and his discussions with representatives of the Albanian parties in Macedonia. As an experienced diplomatic professional, Comras probably knows the rules of his engagement. However, tackling such a topic as education, and especially the so- called university in Albanian language, only aggravates the interethnic tension in Macedonia. The search for forms of interethnic democracy is a very sensitive matter that requires great patience. Comras's visit and the statements cited nonetheless go beyond the boundaries of diplomatic manners, especially because he is familiar with the delicate state of interethnic relations. That is also why it is seen as interference in the state's internal affairs. And, Macedonia has them, even if it is the United States that is involved.

It is precisely the subtlety of the relations in the area of ethnic relations that has saved Macedonia from conflicts. By treating the ethnic diversities as a resource that is distinctive in Macedonian tradition and by showing tolerance towards the processes of the discovery of national identity in a pluralist and multicultural atmosphere, Macedonia avoided both majority domination and division. It was understood that national particularities had to be exposed together with integration, a opposed to ghettoization. The Macedonians are also faced with temptations of this kind. Nevertheless, to be freed from divisions, which creates a dangerous situation in which the theory and practice have to be combined, means living together. This is why the games in the field of democracy and national sentiments are extremely sensitive and risky. Ethnic divisions, ethnic cleansing, and nationalism are contrary to democracy. To believe that divisions are democracy, in an atmophere such as the Macedonian, can contribute to such a segmentation and a life in which a reduction of values and national and creative impoverishment becomes inevitable.

To politicize these fields brings the danger of questioning the models of multiethnic democracy, integrity of life, and the freedom of ideas. The individual identity will be lost, and intellectual idleness will be created by tying up all such ideas (tied up in one's own literature, in one's own publishing and reading, and in one's own writers). It is necessary to give up the old illusions and exaggerated evaluations. Things can not be simplified, because if one step is made, it opens other processes. We have the chance to develop a different kind of maturity. Otherwise, we begin to mistrust our own beliefs and convictions. The Bosnian hell must serve as a warning. This is the most drastic example of ethnic, internal, and external alienation at the end of this century. Finally, the world and man are more inclined toward alternatives that offer global projects and not trivial internal confinements.

Poland: Daily on Russian 'Offensive' Against NATO

WS3101113496 Warsaw TRYBUNA in Polish 29 Jan 96 p 1

[Commentary by Chief Editor Dariusz Szymczycha: "100 Words"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Russia's vociferous warnings against NATO's expansion to the East and the promotion of the head of Russian intelligence to foreign minister give the recent political crisis in Poland new meaning. This is no longer an internal fight for power.

The espionage charges brought against the prime minister and the way in which the case was handled by [former Foreign] Minister Milczanowski, some of the politicians, and the media were in fact a favor for the Russians. The opposition in Poland and Polish opinion-makers themselves are blatantly proving that Poland is not a credible partner for NATO!

As I was writing my article "Roguery," I thought things would come to this. After the recent talks between President Yeltsin, President Clinton, and German Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, we know more. And we have reason to feel worse. The Russian offensive against Poland's joining NATO was launched at a very significant moment for us.

Poland: Polish Ambassador to Lithuania Interviewed

WS3001130996 Szczecin GLOS SZCZECINSKI in Polish 17 Jan 96 p 10

[Interview with Jan Widacki, Polish ambassador to Lithuania, by Antoni Lewandowski; place and date not given: "We Do Not Support Seeking Autonomy"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Lewandowski] In what way is the Polish-Lithuanian Treaty being implemented today?

[Widacki] Three years ago, Polish-Lithuanian relations were not good, and initial preparations for the treaty were accompanied by nationwide discussion in Lithuania. All arguments for and against, grievances and objections against Poland, mainly in a historical context, were raised. From the very start, we were of the opinion that history should be left to historians. The Lithuanians needed more time to understand that. On 26 April 1994, the treaty was signed and, after a stormy debate in the Lithuanian parliament, ratified. For two years, Polish-Lithuanian relations have been on a totally different level. They are very good, friendly, which can be seen not only on the international level but also between our nations. The Polish-Lithuanian Treaty is fully observed and implemented in line with the solutions adopted by both parties.

[Lewandowski] Can one therefore say that Poles' rights are fully honored in Lithuania?

[Widacki] Yes, thoroughly. To be quite truthful, there is an opinion in Lithuania and in some milieux in Poland that it was the Poles in Lithuania who paid for those good Polish-Lithuanian relations—that we sold those Poles for the good of international relations. This is obviously not true. From the start, we demanded the same rights for Poles as those set for ethnic minorities by international norms and binding European standards. And those rights were granted to Poles. Today, the Polish minority in Lithuania and the Lithuanian minority in Poland have even more favorable rights than those set by European standards.

[Lewandowski] Have there been any instances of violating those rights?

[Widacki] We have not recorded any violations of the treaty, but there are instances of some officials' thoughtless actions or ill-natured decisions. If such incidents did occur, we would immediately take action, and never did it happen that the Lithuanian authorities failed to take appropriate steps. For instance, after the introduction of a new act on the official language, Lithuanian inspectors questioned bilingual captions at a Polish bookstore and even menus at restaurants. After an appeal had been filed to the National Committee for the Lithuanian Language, our action was taken into consideration, and officials were promptly reprimanded. At present, bilingual captions are not questioned.

[Lewandowski] Leaders of the biggest Polish organization, that of the Union of Poles in Lithuania [ZPnL], differ on the issue. Lately, they have sent a "statement" addressed to Algirdas Brazauskas, president of the Lithuanian Republic, protesting against discrimination of Poles in Lithuania. What is your opinion about this?

[Widacki] The matter of protests should be considered from a political point of view. We clearly say—which some Polish political activists do not like—that we will not give support to any ideas going beyond the limits set by ethnic minorities' standards. In particular, we will offer no support to ideas seeking autonomy. It is obvious that Polish minority's rights safeguard full autonomy for culture and language, whereas territorial and administrative autonomy, excluding self-governing and political autonomy, must be ruled out. There is no constituency, and one will not find any in Lithuania that would approve of, for instance, an autonomy around Vilnus. Yet, if we sought it, we would have a constant conflict with Lithuania—a hopeless one.

[Lewandowski] ZPnL activists in Lithuania say that you pay more attention to matters of the Lithuanian state rather than to Poles' interests in Lithuania.

[Widacki] As I said, we are taking care of all Poles, and our task is, most of all, to ensure that all European standards concerning ethnic minorities are respected. Deputy Ryszard Maciejkianiec, ZPnL president and the activists around him, are the gentlemen who are living on conflicts; at least they are living on them in the political sense. This is why they need this conflict and are continuously generating it. This conflict is really not in the interests of the Polish community. Therefore, more and more social, cultural, and economic initiatives are appearing among Poles, and we support these initiatives wholeheartedly.

Poland: Freedom Union Leader on Olesky Affair

BR3001144196 Paris LIBERATION in French 30 Jan 96 p 10

[Interview with Bronislaw Geremek, a leader of the Freedom Union, by Elisabeth Kulakowska in Warsaw; date not given: "Geremek Concerned About Oleksy Affair"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Warsaw—*Bronislaw Geremek, chairman of the parliamentary foreign affairs committee, historian, and a leader of the opposition Freedom Union, is concerned about the consequences of the political crisis in Poland caused by the resignation of Prime Minister Jozef Oleks,y who stands accused of spying for Moscow and who neverthelesse was elected unanimously as leader of Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP] (the former communists).*

[Kulakowska] What is your opinion of this affair?

[Geremek] Everything leads us to believe that there has not been any plot by the Polish special services (as Oleksy claimed—LIBERATION editor's note). As for the former prime minister's guilt, it is up to justice to decide. However, there are still political consequences. Whereas in the beginning the accusations were being leveled at only one person, gradually, with the press getting involved, the whole of Jozef Oleksy's political group was affected (the SdRP—LIBERATION editor's note). What we are seeing is akin to democracy losing its legitimacy. People are accusing a party that, in the free and democratic elections of 1993 won a fifth of all votes, of participating in international networks. Moreover, in the eyes of international opinion, the "Oleksy affair" is a test of Polish democracy and independence. The most important thing is not the final result of the inquiry but the way in which this problem is resolved.

[Kulakowska] What are the possible solutions for resolving this crisis?

[Geremek] The Freedom Union suggested to President Kwasniewski on 26 January the formation of a "nonpartisan" government led by Wladyslaw Bartoszewski (the former foreign minister—LIBERATION editor's note). We thereby offered the president a way of resolving this unusual crisis. Wladyslaw Bartoszewski is one of the few Poles to benefit from a very high moral standing in Poland and abroad. He could restore Poland's image of stability and credibility.

[Kulakowska] Do the negotiations for Poland's membership in the EU and NATO risk being more difficult as a consequence?

[Geremek] On his first official visits, in January, to Bonn, Paris, and Brussels, everyone reassured President Kwasniewski that Poland is considered a trustworthy partner. Having said that, Poland's entry into European structures has long been opposed by some people in the West. To date it has been hard for them to refuse access to European institutions to the country of Solidarity, which launched the process that brought down communism and marked the beginning of the end of the Cold War. The "Oleksy affair" is giving them a ready-made argument. It is no reason for reticence relative to Poland, but it acts as a convenient excuse.

[Kulakowska] What is your opinion of President Aleksander Kwasniewski's first month in office?

[Geremek] Against the backdrop of the state in serious crisis, the president has so far remained passive in an instance when he should have assumed the role of arbiter. It has been a wasted month.

[Kulakowska] How do you explain the fact that on 27 January Jozef Oleksy was elected virtually unanimously as leader of the SdRP?

[Geremek] The postcommunists feel they are the butt of attacks aimied at isolating and destroying them. Jozef Oleksy's election proves that, in the eyes of the party delegates, there is nothing wrong with a senior party member being accused of collaboration with foreign secret services. In light of that, we can legitimately wonder how far this postcommunist party has really moved from its previous position as a slave to the Soviet Union.

[Kulakowska] Are you in favor of outlawing the SdRP, as the parties of the Right are suggesting?

[Geremek] No, I am totally opposed to that. That is a totalitarian practice. However, it is very worrying that, in the government coalition, there is a party suspected of having close ties to Russia.

Poland: Oleksy Appointment as SdRP Head Criticized

WS3001155296

[FBIS Report] On 29 January three major Warsaw vernacular dailies carried commentaries by chief editors on the election of Jozef Oleksy as chairman of the Social Democracy of the Polish Republic [SdRP].

RZECZPOSPOLITA, a centrist newspaper, on page four carries a 600-word commentary by Dariusz Fikus under the title "Defense at All Costs." The author points out that "the border between what is acceptable and moral and what is unacceptable has become blurred in Poland." He goes on to say: "Can a politician maintain relations with a KGB agent for years? Should friendship with a Soviet and then Russian diplomat, politically natural before 1989, be condemned now that Poland has regained independence? Is partying at the Soviet Embassy much different from partying at one's own home with a diplomat of whose second profession one is undoubtedly aware? The Poles, as it turns out, have different answers to these questions. This is causing a dichotomy in the nation." He goes on to say: "Under the circumstances, the strategy of defending a besieged castle is quite natural. Jozef Oleksy is no longer prime minister, but he can head the largest party in the country. That party is not cutting itself away from it roots; it is ashamed of neither its communist past nor the numerous ties it has to that past. On the contrary, it is proud of all of that. This is a sign that throwing such arguments in the postcommunists' faces will not cause their political defeat." Dariusz Fikus concludes: "The determination of the SdRP leaders is understandable, yet this road does not lead them anywhere, and will, as a consequence, ruin their party's image."

GAZETA WYBORCZA, a left of center independent daily, publishes a front-page 300-word editorial entitled "The SdRP Is Losing Credibility" by Chief Editor Adam Michnik. Acknowledging the fact that the appointment of Jozef Oleksy to chair the SdRP is the party's sovereign decision, Michnik states that, "for the general public, it is also a manifestation of astounding arrogance on the part of postcommunist politicians." "I cannot comprehend," writes Michnik, "how the largest party in our country can appoint as chairman a politician who lost credibility as head of the cabinet. I wonder what sort of partner Jozef Oleksy will make for social-democrat leaders in the West—Jospin, Lafontaine, and Vranitzky. But, as they say, 'this is not my circus, therefore these are not my monkeys.'" Michnik echoes the thought expressed by Dariusz Fikus: "The SdRP has entered the warpath and turned itself into a besieged castle: It will defend Oleksy just like it defended [former head of the Main Customs Office] Sekula or [recent Justice Minister] Jaskiernia." He concludes: "Ever since 1989, I have been against militant anticommunism and have said so in public on numerous occasions. That is why a sense of responsibility compels me to state today that a party that ostentatiously appoints a man accused of ties to the KGB for its head is depriving itself of democratic credibility."

ZYCIE WARSZAWY, in a front-page, 250-word editorial entitled "Internal Problem," acting Chief Editor Jerzy Wysocki warns: "The postcommunists must consider the political consequences of their choice. One might expect that the remaining parties, with the exception of the ever-faithful peasants, will be even less inclined to cooperate, and chances for creating a wide coalition will be zilch not only for now but also in the long term." Wysocki's predictions of the SdRP's future are not much different from those of Fikus and Michnik: "After six years of more or less successful attempts at regaining credibility and entering the democratic party scene, the postcommunists are facing the threat of being completely isolated once again. This may not necessarily be cause for concern for the SdRP leaders as long as they have voter support. And that support is surprisingly strong. What will happen, however, once the voters cease to believe that the whole case was a provocation and that Oleksy is innocent? That will be the end of the entire political camp."

Poland: Peasant Party Chairman on Cabinet Reshuffle

WS3001114496 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 27-28 Jan 96 p 2

[Interview with Waldemar Pawlak, chairman of the Polish Peasant Party, by Ewa K. Czaczkowska; place and date not given: "We Want a Prime Minister Who Is Not Involved in Politics"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [Czaczkowska] The Polish Peasant Party [PSL] continues to support the candidacy of Miroslaw Pietrewicz for prime minister. The Democratic Left Alliance [SLD] is against it. Sejm Speaker Zych, on the other hand, turned down the SLD proposal to take this office. Under these circumstances, will the PSL accept the candidacy of Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz or Marek Borowski?

[Pawlak] We believe that it is currently very important to calm the atmosphere surrounding the government; hence our candidacy of Miroslaw Pietrewicz, a professor of economics, for prime minister. He is very knowledgeable of state economics and regional policies. We want the government to work until the parliamentary elections, without involving itself in political squabbles.

[Czaczkowska] The SLD does not agree with that. It claims that the prime minister should be a politician, not an economist. Is a compromise possible?

[Pawlak] We could reach an agreement very quickly if the question were only whether this is to be a politician or an economist. I do not rule out the possibility that this criterion might be verified. As we see it, we have to guarantee that the government can work efficiently and calmly. Political issues should be settled in parliament by politicians who use proof and facts in order to solve problems objectively.

[Czaczkowska] Could [Foreign Minister] Dariusz Rosati or [Deputy Prime Minister] Luczak not give the government such guarantees?

[Pawlak] One could really mention many names; each day brings new ones. Our proposal consists of suggesting someone who would not be involved in political wrangles and—this is my private opinion—it would be advisable to reach for experts from other groups and not just from the PSL and the SLD.

[Czaczkowska] Did the PSL leaders try to persuade Speaker Zych to take the office of prime minister?

[Pawlak] We will still talk about that. I think that on 27 January, when the regional activists of the PSL arrive in Warsaw, they will also like to hear the reasons for the speaker's decision. We discussed that offer last week, but the speaker had already signaled that he did not consider such changes necessary.

I would like to point out not only the personal aspect, but also our platform. At the moment, we have our reservations about the new preferences suggested in the so-called 2000 package. The coalition agreement provides that our top priorities are quick and balanced economic growth, focus on social issues, and macroeconomic stabilization. As for the latter, however, package 2000 provides for a different model of preferences—namely, that within five years the deficit and inflation are to be radically reduced. It is viable but should be subordinated to the provisions of the coalition agreement. We have to settle this issue with our coalition partner because quick and balanced economic growth is a precondition for solving many domestic problems. The scope of the economic administration center should also be defined, disproportions between regions eliminated, and the higher education and health-care systems reformed.

[Czaczkowska] Let us go back to personal issues. The SLD claims it would oppose the coalition agreement if someone from the PSL became prime minister. The PSL would thus hold the offices of both the head of the Cabinet and the Sejm speakership.

[Pawlak] The coalition agreement precisely states that Jozef Oleksy is prime minister, Jozef Zych is the Sejm speaker, and Wlodzimierz Cimoszewicz is the deputy Sejm speaker. The negotiations on the new Cabinet will require amending that agreement.

[Czaczkowska] As chairman of a coalition party, do you not think it is inappropriate to demand of your partner that you be given the three major offices: speakers of the Sejm and Senate and prime minister?

[Pawlak] We talked about this at the coalition meeting.

[Czaczkowska] What other changes will the PSL demand in the Cabinet? There has been talk about the justice minister.

[Pawlak] Without delving into details, I would like to say that, when we speak of reconstructing the government, we do not mean changing only the head of the Council of Ministers.

[Czaczkowska] What do you think of the Freedom Union's initiative of creating a supraparty government for restructuring the credibility of the state?

[Pawlak] Let us stick to democratic solutions that comply with democratic practices.

[Czaczkowska] The session of the National Council, apart from coalition issues, is to appraise the party leadership. In December, several members of the National Executive Committee, yourself included, failed to win a vote of confidence. Do you intend to resign as chairman of the party?

[Pawlak] I believe the National Council will continue what it began on 16 December 1995.

Poland: Democratic Left Party Leading in Polls

LD3001152296 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1205 GMT 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] The latest polls carried out by the Public Opinion Research Center show that, in the next parliamentary elections, 21 percent of those polled would vote for the Democratic Left Alliance. This was the largest figure for any one party. Solidarity, with 11 percent, would be in second place, ahead of the Freedom Union, which would gain 10 percent of the vote. The Movement for the Reconstruction of Poland would be next with 9 percent, and then the Polish Peasant Party with 8 percent. Of those polled, 51 percent said they planned to vote in the elections.

Poland: Minister Deprives Wilecki of Army Money

WS3001144396 Warsaw SZTANDAR in Polish 30 Jan 96 p 3

[Article by Wojciech Luczak: "War Between the Ministry of National Defense and the General Staff; Who Is in Charge of the Money?"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *As a result of a decision made by Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski, General Tadeusz Wilecki, chief of the General Staff, has no say on the finances of the Armed Forces. Meanwhile, however, the minister has resigned.*

Gen. Wilecki, chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, learned from the press that the new defense minister deprived him of supervision over the Economic and Financial Directorate of the General Staff. Thus far the Directorate has been headed by General Pajewski.

The decision was made even though the new Law on the Office of the Defense Minister (which has not yet gone into effect) specifies that the minister makes all decisions pertaining to the military after consulting the chief of the General Staff, or at his motion (Article 3, Point 2). The law further states that the responsibilities of the chief of the General Staff include supervision over projecting and planning the budget of the Armed Forces (Article 8). It thus seems that Wilecki will "project and plan" empty-handed. All the money is now held by the new deputy defense minister, also a general but now wearing a civilian suit, 61-year-old Tadeusz Grabowski.

On 19 January 1996, Minister Dobrzanski issued a decision appointing two new deputy defense ministers—Andrzej Zalucki (for parliamentary issues) and Tadeusz Grabowski (head of the Finance Department). The same document number 5 (it is not classified) provides for the dissolution of the Economic and Financial Directorate of the General Staff, which was established in 1994. Thus far omnipotent, Wilecki has been cut off from the money.

There is more. On the very same day—19 January—Dobrzanski made another move in his duel with the General Staff. We learned from unofficial sources that in a classified memo he instructed Wilecki to immediately shut down all units of the General Staff that he thought duplicated the operations of identical units at the Ministry of National Defense. He allegedly listed four of them.

To top everything, Dobrzanski, just like all the ministers of the Oleksy Cabinet, has resigned. Wilecki, however, has not been dismissed by anyone. Moreover, the Law on the Office of the Defense Minister has not yet gone into effect; therefore, the military secret services—the Military Information Services—continue to be supervised by Wilecki, not Dobrzanski...

Poland: Defense Minister Considering Jet Plane Offer

LD3001171696 Warsaw Polskie Radio First Program Network in Polish 1500 GMT 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] [Announcer] Stanislaw Dobrzanski, minister of national defense, has confirmed press reports that representatives of the Army are going to Germany to acquaint themselves with an offer for the purchase of Alpha fighter and training jets that have been withdrawn from the Bundeswehr Air Force.

[Dobrzanski voice] We shall be checking out all purchasing and industrial cooperation opportunities. Please do not try to sensationalize this. The delegation has really gone, and the delegation will really check what sort of proposal there is with these Alpha jets.

[Announcer] In the morning, Lieutenant Colonel Eugeniusz Mleczak had claimed that the visit of the Polish delegation, which has been in Germany since yesterday [29 January], had nothing to do with the purchase of Alpha jets.

Poland: Kolodko Outlines Economic Development Plan

LD3101123196 Warsaw Radio Zet Network in Polish 0710 GMT 31 Jan 96

[Interview with Grzegorz Kolodko, deputy prime minister and finance minister, by correspondent Krzysztof Skowronski in Warsaw—live]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Skowronski] Good morning.

[Kolodko] Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.

[Skowronski] What are the coalition arguments about?

[Kolodko] There are no coalition arguments. There is tough talking. As it happens, there are only men on the negotiation teams. However, I am not taking part in these discussions and negotiations. [passage omitted]

[Skowronski] What is Package 2000, a Strategy for Poland?

[Kolodko] It is a specific expansion of the Strategy for Poland program, with an attempt to extend the timetable until the year 2000. One has to act with greater impetus and ambition, take a deeper breath. Generally speaking, the stress is on two issues:

First, the need to maintain certain financial proportions—a macroeconomic equilibrium—in order to create and consolidate the conditions for fast economic growth, which have already been created as a result of the implementation of the Strategy for Poland program so far, and of Poland's transformations of six years. The national income, the most synthetic indicator of our prosperity, would increase by more than 30 percent in a five-year period, with a very fast increase in investment. That is why the investment rate must increase and savings must increase.

Package 2000 is primarily stressing the link between taxes and the ability to save, accumulate capital, and invest, and, as a result, the creation of a base for economic development. Society's prosperity, its better material situation, can only be built on this basis. Wages will then grow and expenditures will grow.

The general idea is that, at this stage of transformations, stability and growth, which we have managed to achieve—with an improved competitiveness of Polish companies, particularly in the private sector, which is developing faster, but also in the public sector—one can make the effort to introduce a successive, gradual, well-thought-out, and professionally well-calculated (which we have carried out at the Finance Ministry) reduction of taxes. These proposals are contained in the Package.

[Skowronski, interrupting] Are you going to reduce taxes as of 1997?

[Kolodko] As the finance minister of the Polish Republic, I shall submit a draft law that will include proposals for the reduction of income tax thresholds to 20, 30, and 40 percent. I believe there are economic conditions for lowering tax thresholds for our taxpayers, linked to a certain degree with tax allowances, which should be targeted mainly on supporting and developing housing construction. [passage omitted]

The other direction of this program is a strong anti-inflation process. I have very strong support from entrepreneurs, investors, and businessmen, and also—I personally value this—from President Kwasniewski, who received me yesterday. He spent an hour discussing the Package with me and he thinks this is a difficult but ambitious plan. However, he says that we should set precisely such objectives for ourselves and that he would support it.

[Skowronski] What are the main premises of this package? Is it constant economic growth?

[Kolodko] Certainly. This is our aim. The social aim is to improve living standards, to increase the rate of consumption, and to reduce unemployment. When it comes to economic objectives, this has to happen by maintaining a high rate of economic growth, at least 5.5 percent on average per year.

[Skowronski, interrupting] [Passage omitted]

[Kolodko] Our proposal is also to reduce taxes for legal entities. To put it in human language: for companies, firms, both private and public and municipal ones. This would be done according to a so-called sunset mechanism. This means that we already know when the sun is supposed to set—that is, in the year 2000. By that point, the tax should be reduced to 32 percent. At present, it is 40 percent. The proposal, which has been a result of thorough and responsible macrofinancial calculations, is that year by year, step by step, we should be going down two points at a time. In other words, provided this plan is accepted by the government, parliament, and the public, we would reduce the tax from the present 40 percent to 38, 36, 34, and 32 percent, respectively. This would be linked to the rationalized system of allowances, focused mainly on investment.

The high level of investment and exports, together with housing construction, for which there will be preferential treatment in the form of tax allowances, and together with increased domestic demand for goods, as a result of larger personal incomes of Poles achieved by a reduction in income taxes, will constitute the [economic] impetus. So this is a comprehensive package, a comprehensive approach, as you can see, ladies and gentlemen. Hence, the name "Package." And why "2000"? Because we have to extend the timetable. [passage omitted]

The entire text of the "Package 2000, a Strategy for Poland," has been published in our two most important newspapers, RZECZPOSPOLITA and NOWA EUROPA. [passage omitted]

Generally speaking, President Kwasniewski thinks this is a modern, ambitious, and difficult program that will serve the Polish economy well. That is why he supports it. I believe that this support will perhaps make it easier for us to implement the Strategy for Poland, Package 2000 successfully. [passage omitted]

[Skowronski] The guest of Radio Zet today was Grzegorz Kolodko, deputy prime minister and minister of finance.

[Kolodko] Thank you.

Poland: Kolodko Presents Tax Plans Up to 2000

WS3001150096 Warsaw GAZETA WYBORCZA in Polish 30 Jan 96 p 17

[Article by Piotr Skwirowski: "Taxes Down"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *There is a chance that we will be paying lower taxes. Deputy Prime Minister Grzegorz*

Kolodko is announcing a return to the 20-, 30-, and 40-percent tax rates. He is saying that this will happen as soon as next year.

The "2000 Package," a taxation plan drawn up by Kolodko, envisions lower taxes for both companies and individuals. Every day the deputy prime minister reveals new details of his program. Yesterday he discussed it with representatives of the Confederation of Polish Employers.

"For the time being, the 'Package' is not an official, governmental document. It is my draft," Kolodko admitted. However, he also announced that on the following day he would present it to President Kwasniewski and to the Economic Committee of the Council of Ministers.

For the People

Kolodko proposes reintroduction of the 20-, 30-, and 40-percent rates for personal income as early as 1997. These rates were binding in 1992 and 1993. Then the coalition of the Democratic Left Alliance and the Polish Peasant Party raised taxes—to 21, 33, and 45 percent. It was promised then that the higher tax rates would be binding for one year only. However, they still exist.

For Investors

Until the year 2000, capital income, such as revenues yielded by the sale of shares, would be tax-free. Previously the ministry believed that the "stock market" tax break should be lifted at the end of this year. However, last year's unsuccessful experiment with the tax on stock market transactions proved that this tax cannot yield great revenues to the budget and that the drop in the share prices at the stock market decreases the revenues derived from the sale of companies that are being privatized.

For Companies

The deputy prime minister also proposes gradual reduction of the personal income tax rate on companies. Today companies have to give the budget as much as 40 percent of their profits. In line with the "package," as early as 1997 this rate would fall to 38 percent. Then it would decrease by 2 percent every year, to reach 32 percent in the year 2000.

At the same time, Kolodko proposes "rationalization of the tax break system." This probably involves considerable limitation of investment tax breaks.

Next year the import tax, which amounts to 3 percent today, would finally be lifted.

Indirect and Stable

How is it possible that the budget can afford to lower taxes? Deputy Prime Minister Kolodko argues that more money will come to the budget as a result of the "change in the structure of the revenues." We will pay less money directly, but we will have to pay more when, for example, we buy goods in a shop.

The budget is counting primarily on direct taxes, primarily on the VAT [value-added tax]. It will decrease the number of goods with preferential VAT rates; the basic 22-percent VAT will be increasingly common.

Reduction of taxes is not all. "I would like our tax system to be stable, predictable, credible, and prodevelopment," Kolodko explained.

According to him, this means that the tax regulations will not alter suddenly. The taxpayer should, for example, know a few years ahead what taxes he will be paying. The "prodevelopment" character would involve introduction of changes to the system that would be favorable to the economy, that would enhance the competitiveness of Polish goods and services, and that would encourage capital spending.

Introduction of the "Package" is to help reduce inflation to approximately 5 percent and the budget deficit to approximately 1.5 percent of the GDP in the year 2000. Economic growth is to continue at the level of 5.5 percent.

According to Kolodko, "Poland will never be an Eldorado because, simply, there are no Eldorados." Nonetheless, thanks to the "Package," we will have a "wisely run, efficient economy."

Poland: Siemens Seeks To Install GSM System

WS3001154496 Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 26 Jan 96 p 13

[Article by D.M.: "GSM in Poland; Siemens Wants To Build a Network"]

[FBIS Translated Text] *Siemens would like to install in Poland a Global Standard for Mobile Communication [GSM] system for one of the consortia that will win the bidding to build a cellular GSM network. Yesterday representatives of the concern presented a demonstration GSM system. It consists of several base stations that provide communication services to 10 percent of a given town, as well as a controller of the base stations and a radio telephone exchange that is connected to the local network of the Polish Telecommunications SA in Warsaw. According to representatives of the company, the first people might be connected to the Siemens system as soon as next fall.*

Siemens, a German telecommunications concern, manufactures EWSD [expansion unknown] cellular exchanges, which are used by telephone owners all over the world. Engineers of the company have created a system of mobile communication that meets the GSM D-900 standard and that can be equipped with additional functions, depending on the requirements of a given operator. Currently, the company's equipment is being used by 55 operators in 43 countries; they provide cellular telephone services to more than 4 million people.

Siemens has factories manufacturing GSM equipment in such countries as Spain, Austria, China, South Africa, and Italy. Franz Adamek, sales director for Europe, said at a press conference yesterday that, by using its international production potential, Siemens is able to put into effect any projects of GSM network operators; these can be projects with any degree of complexity and scope. In Poland it is planning to use the infrastructure of ZWUT SA to manufacture network elements of the D900 system. Currently, ZWUT SA, which Siemens has owned since 1992, is one of the three suppliers of telephone exchanges in Poland.

"Siemens has been operating in Poland for over 100 years. It has invested 80 million German marks so far. The concern considers our country [as published] to be its most important market in Central-East Europe," Director Josef Huber declared yesterday. According to him, introduction of a cellular telephone system in Poland will make it possible to increase the number of telephone owners; it may also be very favorable to the Polish economy.

Romania: Geoana Discusses EU Integration, NATO

AU3101085496 Bucharest JURNALUL NATIONAL in Romanian 22 Jan 96 pp 16-17

[Interview with Mircea Geoana, ambassador to the United States, by Cornel Feruta; place and date not given: "I Took Advantage of the Generation Gap and Asserted Myself"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Feruta] Could Romania find genuine support in Washington in the race for its euro-atlantic integration?

[Geoana] I believe that Washington is Romania's most important point of support; it is obvious that the United States dominates the contemporary world, and not just at a unilateral or global level, and it is equally obvious that at the level of the euro-atlantic alliances (I refer to NATO,) it plays a decisive role. However, I would like to note that NATO includes 16 countries, and even if their weight is not equal, our relations with each of them are extremely important.

[Feruta] What role do you think Romania can play in the current European context? Does it have any special trump cards as compared to its sisters on the way to European integration, especially in joining the European Union?

[Geoana] Of course, we have numerous such trump cards, which are quite obvious both for us and our Western partners. We have to be aware of the fact that the road to integration is not a simple one, and it requires extremely great efforts on the domestic plane, efforts for political, economic, and industrial restructuring, and to adapt our legislation. Romania definitely has considerable potential, and I believe that, together with Poland, Romania represents a serious candidate for the European Union and NATO.

[Feruta] Could the radicalization in Moscow's stance with respect to the NATO expansion not be exaggerated in the future, so that they would go beyond issuing principle declarations and warnings?

[Geoana] I believe that one should not overestimate certain statements made sometimes in the very tormented electoral context in the Russian Federation. This is a period when following parliamentary elections, they are approaching the finish line in the presidential race. Nevertheless, I think that we cannot ignore the fact that Russia may harden, including in the foreign policy field, its opposition to expansion of NATO.

[Feruta] How would you explain the "red tide," which began to spread over the East European countries?

[Geoana] I think that this is a natural phenomenon in this region of ours. I do not think we have to do with a "red tide," but rather with the fact that certain governments of center-left, social-democratic orientation have seized power. I think that this is a natural thing in any democracy, and such an option on behalf of the electorate highlights the difficulty of the transition process, as well as the high costs of transition. I consider that this is a natural democratic construction, which reflects a large-scale ideology current in Europe, namely, social democracy. [passage omitted]

Romania: CDR To Vote on Lifting Tudor's Immunity

AU3101130296 Bucharest ADEVARUL in Romanian 26 Jan 96 p 10

[Interview with Emil Constantinescu, president of the Democratic Convention of Romania, CDR, by unidentified ADEVARUL correspondent; place and date not given: "The CDR Parliament Members Will Vote for the Lifting of C.V. Tudor's Immunity"]

[FBIS Translated Text] [ADEVARUL] Mr. Constantinescu, you said that call to the head of state on Wednesday has a precedence. What were you referring to?

[Constantinescu] My first statement, made in February 1994, referred to Senator Corneliu Vadim Tudor's accusations against General Spiroiu, who was minister of defense at that time. I asked the president to take measures to verify the truth and said that if what Senator Tudor said was true, then the minister should be dismissed, but if it was not true, then measures should be taken against the one who raised the calumny. The second declaration goes back to August 1995 and referred to Tudor's attacks against President Ion Iliescu. In the first case, although a parliamentary commission that examined the proof evidence by Corneliu Vadim Tudor established that Gen. Spiroiu was innocent and that the evidence was false, the solution was the dismissal of the general and further support granted by the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] for the reelection of the PRM senator as Senate secretary. The spokesman's answer to the second statement was that the president does not lower himself to discuss such statements. However, president was not being attacked, but the presidential institution. C.V. Tudor's remarks referred to the betrayal of the country. In this situation, it is incomprehensible that the PDSR—which, as everybody knows, is backed by President Iliescu—again supported the reelection of Senator Tudor to the position of Senate secretary. This did nothing except encourage him to extend his accusations against the leadership of all fundamental institutions of the state: the Court of Justice, the General Prosecutor's Office, and the secret services.

[ADEVARUL] Why have you renewed your address to the president?

[Constantinescu] This week, the situation escalated when not only documents, let us say, referring to SRI [Romanian Intelligence Service] Director Virgil Magureanu or other persons were published, but data regarding the existence of some accords concluded between various secret services or other data that questioned precisely the credibility of the secret service. From that moment, national security was in question. Thus, we have reached an extremely serious situation in which, for electoral purposes, information of national interest is being used.

[ADEVARUL] What do you expect from the president's intervention?

[Constantinescu] I believe that the president should call a meeting of the Country's Supreme Defense Council and examine the situation that has been created. Then, he should call a meeting with leaders of parliamentary parties and ask them to lift Senator Corneliu Vadim Tudor's parliamentary immunity and ask the Prosecutor's Office and the Court of Justice to judge him. And third, he should address the nation in order to reestablish the trust in the fundamental institutions of the state, including the presidential institution.

[ADEVARUL] Does the entire CDR support your action?

[Constantinescu] In the meeting held yesterday, the Executive Committee decided that the Parliament members included on the CDR's list will vote for the lifting of Senator Tudor's parliamentary immunity. On the other hand, the Executive Committee asked that Parliament discuss at priority precedence the draft law advanced by the CDR on handling files, according to which we believe that each citizen should have access to his own Securitate file and nobody else should have access to personal files, in order to protect the Romanian society from blackmail and chaos. In the case of persons who run for high-ranking positions, it should be compulsory to submit a statement in advance regarding possible cooperation with the Securitate structures.

Romania: PNTCD Calls For 'Moral Reconstruction'

AU3001103496 Bucharest ROMANIA LIBERA in Romanian 23 Jan 96 p 2

["Excerpts from the Resolution of the Congress of the National Peasant Christian Democratic Party," passed in Bucharest on 21 January: "Society's Reconstruction Should Start With the Moral Reconstruction"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The National Peasant Christian Democratic Party [PNTCD], out of concern for the Romanian people's sufferings and aspirations, proposes the following priority objectives:

—The moral and political reconstruction of the nation, by laying emphasis on the traditional institutions which have ensured our survival along the centuries: family, church, and school. We conceive the national reconciliation as an imperative requirement to be achieved in the spirit of Christian morality.

—The consistent struggle against corruption, which must be open and concrete, aimed at pursuing and punishing the guilty...

—The resolute promotion of the real mechanisms and institutions of a rule-of-law state. In this respect, we express our firm disapproval of the excesses of a government by ordinances... Similarly, taking advantage of a loophole in the Constitution, the prime minister is constantly resorting to reshuffles, thus appointing ministers who were not approved by Parliament....

—Ensuring the independence and correctness of the justice system through a genuine reform of the system...

—Guaranteeing the right to information, by turning the radio and television stations into truly autonomous public services, out of the executive's influence and by developing alternative radio and television stations...

—Decentralizing the local administration and ensuring the participation of local communities in political, economic, and social life, in the spirit of Christian-Democratic decentralization and in accordance with the country's Constitution and the European Charter on Local Administration. We firmly reject territorial autonomy on ethnic criteria as a form of local administration...

—Restructuring, modernizing, and professionalizing the military institution, which must be carried out under parliamentary control, by ensuring its compatibility with euro-atlantic bodies.

—Demilitarizing and depoliticizing the public security forces, which must become elite professional units.

—Setting up efficient intelligence structures, which do not violate the norms of the rule-of-law state and do not jeopardize civic rights and freedoms... Similarly, we back the right of citizens to have access to their own Securitate files and we favor banning the access of former Communist dignitaries to leading positions...

—...The PNTCD aims at coming closer to the aspirations and wishes of the Romanians in Bessarabia [Moldova]

In the sphere of social protection, the PNTCD advocates: creating an appropriate social protection system for the underprivileged groups; generally restructuring the pension system, so as to erase the differences between old and new pensions, and indexing wages and pensions; granting various benefits to pensioners, primarily by cutting tariffs for services and other social facilities in the public sphere...; working out priority programs for the young, to promote their natural integration into social and economic life; and, apropos the relationship with the trade unions, encouraging the creation of truly independent and representative trade unions...

The party states that it will refuse to enter into any kind of alliances with extremist or compromised political groupings.

The solutions advanced by us and our experts for seeing the light of normality at the end of the tunnel have nothing sensational or demagogic about them. They have been carefully weighed up in accordance with today's realities and tomorrow's prospects. We believe that we have made it abundantly clear that society's reconstruction should start with moral reconstruction and with man's qualitative development. The crucial problem of contemporary Romania is not only the absence of laws, as the executive's representatives obsessively keep saying, but especially a failure to observe the laws. Corruption and incompetence are going hand in hand and achieving the Romanian people's full unity, in accordance with international norms and practice... We work for Romania's integration into European and euro-atlantic structures.

—Making education a national priority. The pay of teaching staff should be raised to reflect the social role played by this group and at least 6 percent of GDP should be allocated from the state budget to financing this sector...

—Separating research activity proper from management activity. Financing scientific research from the state budget with at least 1 percent of GDP together with other sources of financing.

—Creating the basis for a computer-based society, since this is the main source of new jobs in developed countries...

—Promoting a primarily preventive health and sanitary policy, which should lay emphasis on preserving the people's health and improving demographic factors...

—In the field of culture, we speak out against the centralization currently imposed by various ministries... We favor making the remuneration of personnel with academic degrees on a par with that of teaching staff...

—Guaranteeing and defending private property through adequate legal provisions and building respect for private property. We hold that there can be no freedom or real democracy without private property... The wrongs done by communism can only be rectified in two ways: through restitution of assets, when such a solution is reasonable and possible, and through just reparations in other instances.

—Conceiving and implementing privatization in such a way as to make it the first decisive step toward creating a middle class in Romania, which will consist of two thirds of the population... The privatization should be massive, sufficiently fast, and of good quality, and it should also take into consideration the effects of the post-privatization period...

—In the field of economic reconstruction: constituting or reconstituting the ownership rights of former agricultural owners and of each inheriting family to a limit of 10 hectares of agricultural land and/or forest; supporting agricultural farms...; supporting the creation and development of small and medium-sized enterprises...; drafting a program of major investment in the infrastructure; and creating a national fund designed to support the financing of the private industrial sector...

—In the sphere of work, regulating and balancing the labor market through reexamining and correlating bases of the relationship between social needs and the structure of the education system on real bases...; establishing wages from the state budget by correlating the calculation basis with the evolution of the average salary in the economy; and fighting unemployment by supporting small and medium-sized enterprises, primarily in the private sector...

—In the sphere of social protection, the PNTCD advocates: creating an appropriate social protection system for the underprivileged groups; generally restructuring the pension system, so as to erase the differences between old and new pensions, and indexing wages and pensions; granting various benefits to pensioners, primarily by cutting tariffs for services and other social facilities in the public sphere...; working out priority programs for the young, to promote their natural integration into social and economic life; and, apropos the relationship with the trade unions, encouraging the creation of truly independent and representative trade unions...

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With God's help, we will move forward toward victory!

Slovenia: Economics Minister Tajnikar Resigns

AU3001170396 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] The State Chamber today started debating a proposal for the replacement of Minister for Economic Activity Dr. Maks Tajnikar. However, as Vesna Burnik reports, Minister Tajnikar resigned shortly after 1300 [1200 GMT], following an almost one-hour debate.

[Begin Burnik recording] [passage omitted] After Minister Tajnikar's resignation, the State Chamber continued its regular work as Speaker Jozef Skoljc insisted that the State Chamber could only accept the resignation and continue debating other topics. However, Ivo Hvalica [Social Democratic Party of Slovenia], demanded a 30-minute break during which he will, as is expected, present a proposal on how to approach the interpellation [against Tajnikar], that is, the debate on the subject of TAM enterprise, on which primarily the opposition insists. [passage omitted] [end recording]

Slovenia: Three United List Ministers Resign

AU3001173496 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] Ministers of the United List of Social Democrats Dr. Rado Bohinc [Minister of Science and Technology], Sergij Pelhan [Culture Minister], and Rina Klinar [Minister of Labor, Family, and Social Welfare] formally tendered their resignations to Prime Minister Dr. Janez Drnovsek today. [passage omitted]

Slovenia: Opposition Demands Tajnikar Interpellation

AU2601184596

[FBIS Report] Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene in 1430 GMT newscast on 16 January carries the reactions of the Social Democratic Party and the Slovene People's Party to the news on the replacement of the Economics Minister Maks Tajnikar and the related departure of the United List of Social Democrats from the government coalition.

Janez Jansa, president of the Social Democrats, is quoted as saying that "the prime minister decided to propose the replacement of his economics minister three months after the truth about Tajnikar's role in the sinking of the TAM enterprise saw daylight because he was afraid of the debate that would ensue regarding the interpellation. He announced his decision in the wake of this debate. The prime minister was scared of the interpellation, that is, the debate linked to it, because the responsibility of the entire government for the imprudent use of funds earmarked for TAM would doubtlessly be exposed in this debate and, of course, because he was afraid of his responsibility regarding the government's secret service report, which informed the prime minister last March about the sort of people involved in the dealings with TAM." Jansa also warns that, if the debate is not carried out, "we will have no guarantees that the same ministry in the same government, only headed by a different man, would work any better. That is why matters should be clarified." He adds that if the interpellation does not take place, then the party will press "constitutional charges against the prime minister."

In the same newscast, the radio also reports that Franc Zagozen, president of the People's Party, stated at today's news conference that "the Slovene People's Party does not intend to join the government coalition. It will remain in the constructive opposition." Zagozen said that the party "positively hails the fact that Mr. Tajnikar will no longer be economics minister." However, he says that the interpellation of the minister was not merely geared toward his removal but also toward "the clarification of certain procedures in TAM and the entire Maribor basin. The way things stand now, this opportunity will probably not materialize." Zagozen says that the party will study the situation "because it absolutely does not want things to remain buried as, in that case, the Maribor industrial basin could continue to be a victim of such decisions, as it was in the past."

Slovenia: Coalition Discusses Future Legislation

AU3001173196 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 30 Jan 96

[Report by Sandi Frelih—recorded]

[FBIS Translated Text] For the sake of joint coordination of the future work, both government parties [Liberal Democracy and the Slovene Christian Democrats] have formed a coordinating group headed by the parties' general secretaries. Its task is to prepare an agreement on further government work and the legislation that the State Chamber should pass in the time leading up to the elections.

The Executive Committee of the Slovene Christian Democrats also met this morning and assessed that the government parties must reach a consensus on the future work by mid-February.

The Christian Democrats emphasize that the reasons that prompted them to propose early elections are still topical. To recap, this means the inefficiency of foreign policy in relations with our neighbors and our rapprochement with Europe as well as the declining dynamics of Slovenia's transformation in the economic and other spheres of life.

Doubtless, the above are also the questions being discussed by the coordinating group. According to representatives of both parties, for the time being there have been no talks on the names of the new ministers, despite much public speculation.

Both parties are negotiating a proposal not to appoint ministers from within the parties but primarily to find, as they said, competent and effective candidates for these posts.

Slovenia: Agreement on SFRY Debt With FRG Signed

AU2901174496 Ljubljana Radio Slovenia Network in Slovene 1430 GMT 29 Jan 96

[Report by Marta Kos from Bonn]

[FBIS Translated Text] Over an hour ago, Slovene Finance Minister Mitja Gaspari and German Finance Ministry State Secretary Juergen Stark signed an agreement on Slovenia taking over part of the foreign debt of the former SFRY. Today's agreement represents the conclusion of negotiations between Slovenia and Germany that started in 1992. It was known from the very beginning that Germany wanted Slovenia to pay part of the debt that the former Yugoslavia had with the Paris Club. The Paris Club has already agreed to the precedent-case formula of the IMF, according to which 16.4 percent of the debt belongs to Slovenia. At the same time, it demanded that its members sign separate agreements with Slovenia. By signing the bilateral agreement today, Slovenia has committed itself to paying back a total of $186 million to Germany, calculated according to the exchange rate of March 1995.

Federal

FRY: Seselj Ready To Defend Karadzic in The Hague

LD2801234696 Budapest MTV Television Network in Hungarian 1800 GMT 28 Jan 96

[Interview with Serbian Radical Party Chairman Vojislav Seselj by an unidentified correspondent in Belgrade; date not given—recorded; Seselj speaks in Serbo-Croatian with superimposed Hungarian translation]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] [Studio announcer] Only the opposition, which is preparing for the elections due this year, was pleased to hear the statement made this week by Richard Goldstone, prosecutor in the International Tribunal on War Crimes Committed in the Former Yugoslavia. Goldstone said that Serbian President [Slobodan] Milosevic was not really willing to cooperate with his institution. The West is urging the extradition of war criminals, while the Serbian opposition, at an initiative by Serbian Radical Party Chairman Vojislav Seselj, has been organizing a four-party election alliance to oust Milosevic.

Seselj also announced that he was willing to travel to the Hague in order to dismiss accusations against him. [passage omitted]

[Correspondent] Vojislav Seselj, the leader of the Serbian Radical Party, has had a disputed role in atrocities against Bosnian Muslims.

[Announcer] He, for that matter, is considered to be among the most dangerous terrorists even by Washington.

[Seselj] I am convinced that there is no legal ground for the establishment of the Hague International Tribunal. Quite simply, there are no legal principles and norms for this act. If the international community has the intention of calling some people into account and establishing an International Tribunal for this purpose, then first and foremost the number one leaders—Slobodan Milosevic, Franjo Tudjman, and Alija Izetbegovic—should be tried. [passage omitted]

[Reporter] Seselj insists on defending his political allies, [Radovan] Karadzic, who has been accused of war crimes, Milan Martic, former president of Krajina, General [Ratko] Mladic and even the commander of the paramilitary army, Zeljko Raznjatovic-Arkan.

[Seselj] All these accusations have a political nature. I am a living witness, I know it exactly and, since I have all the necessary information, I state positively that neither Radovan Karadzic, nor Milan Martic have ever been able to give direct orders to the Serb forces of the Bosnian Serb Republic or the Krajina Serb Republic in this war. It was exclusively Slobodan Milosevic who could give any kind of direct orders from here, in Belgrade. Even today, the commanders and leaders of the Serb forces receive their salaries from Serbian headquarters in Belgrade. There were no such things as Serbian paramilitary formations in this war. There were, perhaps, smaller, insignificant armed groups here and there, but practically most of the Serb volunteers had been serving in the ranks of the former Yugoslav People's Army, the Serbian troops beyond the Drina river or the Serbian Police Force. What Arkan carried out—directly and in full—was also exclusively ordered by the Interior Ministry in Belgrade. Arkan did not take a single independent step in this war.

[Reporter] What is your opinion about those widely publicized reports, which accuse you personally, your party, and the Radicals' paramilitary forces of war crimes?

[Seselj] As far as I am concerned, I have said several times that if I am accused of any crime in The Hague, I will immediately pack up and travel there to avoid my arrest and a possible court hearing here. There they can ask me, accuse me, and pass judgment on me. I have never committed war crimes and never issued orders to commit war crimes. It is widely known that our volunteers have always been the most principled fighters. We could never allow anyone to accuse us of war crimes without me trying to do everything possible to clear myself before the world.

[Reporter] What will you tell Prosecutor Goldstone if you, by a miracle, happen to appear before him?

[Seselj] I would answer his questions and his possible accusations. In addition to this, I would volunteer to be a witness for the defendant in a possible court proceedings launched against Radovan Karadzic.

[Reporter] Who would you accuse of war crimes?

[Seselj] Only Slobodan Milosevic. [passage omitted]

FRY: Army Generals Receive Bulgarian Army Delegates

LD3101133896 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1031 GMT 31 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Nis, 31 Jan (TANJUG)—A delegation of the Bulgarian Army led by Colonel General Petko Prokopijev, first deputy chief of staff, paid an official visit to the Yugoslav Army today, the information service of the Yugoslav Army's General Staff reports.

The Bulgarian delegation was received by Lieutenant Colonel General Blagoje Kovacevic, the Army's deputy chief of staff, and his aides.

The two delegations exchanged opinions on the current military and political situation, their experience in organization and modernization, and mutual cooperation.

The Bulgarian Army delegation also held talks with Lieutenant Colonel General Dusan Samardzic, commander of the 3d Army. It also visited the Army Technical Education Center in Nis and the cultural and historic monuments of Cele Kula and Cegar, the statement says.

FRY: Army: Situation on Albanian Border 'Normalizing'

AU3101095496 Belgrade VOJSKA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Jan 96 p 15

[Report by Ljiljana Bascarevic: "State Border Is Safe"]

[FBIS Translated Excerpt] A discussion forum on the protection of the military borders in the area of operations of the Pristina Corps during 1995 was held in the Deva watchtower at the beginning of January under the chairmanship of Major General Momir Vukadinovic, head of the Pristina Corps General Staff. In addition to the representatives of this unit's command, the discussion forum was also attended by officers from the border units based in Prizren and Urosevac, and representatives of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the customs.

It was concluded that the state border was protected under intensified international military, political, and economic pressure on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and that there was a constant threat that the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina could spread to Yugoslavia in the conditions when our country was under economic blockade, and this had affected significantly the intensity and methods of work of the members of the border units.

The participants in the debate stressed that last year our border units caught 383 persons trying to cross the border illegally, which is a 433-percent decrease in comparison with 1994. The main motive for illegal crossings was the smuggling of goods in short supply, although there were also other motives. Last year, on the border with Albania and The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, there were 24 incidents in the Corps' area of responsibility. This is 7 percent less than in 1994. Tselve of these incidents took place on the border with Albania. Our border guards were attacked with firearms from Albanian territory on two occasions. The Yugoslav territory also came under firearm attack on two occasions. The territory was also violated four times in other ways. The situation on the Yugoslav-Albanian border is nevertheless becoming calmer, normalizing. Border signs are not being destroyed, there are no attempts at insurgence by larger groups of people, and the members of local mixed commissions have recently been expressing greater readiness to cooperate, the participants in the meeting were told. [passage omitted]

FRY: Foreign Interest in FRY Ships Reported

LD2901135396 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1203 GMT 29 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Novi Sad, Yugoslavia, Jan 29 (TANJUG)—Foreign firms have been showing increased interest in Yugoslav shipbuilding industry, said Monday director of the Novi Sad shipyard Branko Zmukic.

He said that a number of businessmen from Russia, Greece, Holland and Germany had visited the shipyard since the suspension of the U.N. sanctions against Yugoslavia in late November 1995.

Despite the sanctions the Novi Sad shipyard has maintained its production capacities and its experts and, although financially exhausted, is ready to conclude prospective deals, Zmukic said.

He said he hoped that new deals would be concluded with Russian buyers and that the building of 20 ships would start in less than two months.

The 175-million-dollar contract with Russians would be for the building of 130-meter ships of 4,900 tons cargo capacity in 5 years, Zmukic said.

The Novi Sad shipyard, which is among the biggest in Yugoslavia, employs 400 workers and is fully equipped for the building of ships up to 130 metres in length and 7,000 tons cargo capacity.

FRY: TANJUG Economic Monthly of National Interest

LD3001132296 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1212 GMT 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 30 (TANJUG)—The committee for economic sciences of the Serbian Science Ministry has included TANJUG's monthly economic publication EKONOMSKI SIGNALI among journals of national (Yugoslav) interest.

The monthly is published by TANJUG in cooperation with the National Bank of Yugoslavia, a consortium of banks, and several companies. EKONOMSKI SIGNALI presents texts on the current economic situation in Yugoslavia and views of prominent economists on the course of the economic reform and privatization.

The ministry's committee for economic sciences makes up a list of the journals with evaluations of the published scientific works on the grounds of adopted criteria. The works are recognized during the evaluation of scientific results of individuals and entire projects.

The editorial office of EKONOMSKI SIGNALI cooperates with researchers who are engaged on projects of the science ministry, and it publishes their works.

Serbia

Serbia: Refugee Official, UNHCR's O'Keeffe Meet

LD3001190196 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1853 GMT 30 Jan 96

[FBIS Transcribed Text] Belgrade, Jan. 30 (TANJUG)—Serbia's commissioner for refugees Bratislava Morina discussed Tuesday [30 January] with head of the UNHCR mission for Yugoslavia Margaret O'Keeffe the upcoming registration of refugees and displaced persons in Yugoslavia.

The registration will be carried out in cooperation with the UNHCR, as will also programmes of care for refugees through 1996.

The UNHCR has upheld the renewed registration which is aimed at determining the precise number of refugees and displaced persons in Yugoslavia and at stimulating their return home.

The UNHCR has also lent support to the activities of providing accomodations for refugees and relocating them with a view to easing the burden borne by the municipalities where their concentration is the heaviest.

Serbia: GSS Claims Police, Security 'Out of Control'

AU3101104496 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 29 Jan 96 p 6

[Unattributed report: "The State Security Service Is Out of Control"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Zarko Korac, vice president of the Civic Alliance of Serbia [GSS], said two days ago that the Serbian public was facing the "dramatic fact" that the republican assembly has no control over the State Security Service [SDB] and the Interior Ministry.

In a panel discussion on the topic "State Security and the Freedom of Citizens," Korac stressed that the rights and liberties of citizens "have only formally been entered into the Constitution, while in practice the authorities are repressing the population through various and uncontrolled misuse of the SDB and the police."

Korac stressed that the Committee for Defense and Security of the Serbian Assembly had not met for 20 months as the president of the committee—Serbian Renewal Movement Deputy Bogoljub Pejcic—had been removed simply because he requested that the illegal activities of the SDB in Sandzak be put on the agenda of the session.

Serbia: SPO Alleges SPS 'Deceit' on Membership

AU2701165296 Belgrade NASA BORBA in Serbo-Croatian 25 Jan 96 p 5

[Report by M.B.: "Dismissal or Acceptance"]

[FBIS Translated Text] The reverse side of the massive membership drive by the Socialist Party of Serbia [SPS] is that it abounds in misuse and incorrect information, the Information Service of the Serbian Renewal Movement [SPO] has announced.

According to the announcement of the Krusevac SPO Committee, people employed at the Krusevac Assembly recently received notes of acceptance into the SPS and were told that they must decide by noon "whether they will become members of the ruling party or jobless people."

The Lazarevac SPO Committee claims that a similar deceit also took place in their town recently when a trip to Belgrade was organized for workers of the Kolubara Works in order to donate blood for a colleague of theirs. When they arrived in Belgrade, the Lazarevac SPO announcement says, the workers were taken to the City SPS Committee where they were brought before state television cameras and the event was interpreted as if the workers were in fact SPS members who voluntarily donated blood.

Serbia: Daily Editor Optimistic After 'Successful Start'

AU2701170796 Bad Vilbel VESTI in Serbo-Croatian 25 Jan 96 p 9

[Report by V. Mt.: "A Successful Start of DNEVNI TELEGRAF"]

[FBIS Translated Text] For a whole week now, Serbia's newspaper selection has been enhanced by another daily, DNEVNI TELEGRAF [DT]. Substantially different from the dailies already present on the Yugoslav market, this private paper is gradually fighting its way to readers.

So far only 10 issues have been published, and it is still too early for bold assessments and forecasts. The circulation of "DT" amounts to 20,000 copies; for the time being, we are only available in Serbia. Sales are highest in Belgrade, some 13,000 copies, said Slavko Curuvija, director and editor in chief of the youngest Yugoslav daily.

According to Curuvija, it is DNEVNI TELEGRAF's ambition to be at the Yugoslav top in terms of circulation by the end of the year. We published a few pilot issues and it turned out that there is a demand for this type of paper and that we are sought by people. Our concept is a high circulation publication. Initially our goal is to cover the cost of printing in the first six months, but later we hope to be equal to those with the highest circulation.

"DT" is an independent paper in the full sense of the word, the publishers claim, and the editorial concept is professionalism without support for any political option.

I am personally very satisfied with the successful start. The concept we defined is, unfortunately, not to everyone's taste. We are obliged to import all our newsprint since our daily and weekly publications are on Sremska Mirtovica Matroz's [paper manufacturer] "black list," from which we have not up to now received a single sheet of paper, Curuvija explained.

Serbia: Hepatitis Causes Schools Near Belgrade To Close

AU3101105496 Belgrade DNEVNI TELEGRAF in Serbo-Croatian 27 Jan 96 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Jaundice Has Closed Down a School and a Kindergarten"]

[FBIS Translated Text] Belgrade—Health inspectors have closed the primary school, kindergarten, and some facilities for the production and sale of fresh [ziv] food in the village of Drazanj because of a jaundice outbreak. So far, 58 cases of hepatitis have been registered in the villages in the Grocka municipality. The disease has been contracted through contact. The health inspectors have banned the use of drinking water in those facilities that do not have a certificate for water purity from December 1995. Grocka has set up a committee to combat the outbreak.

Montenegro

Montenegro: Serbian Radical Party Founded

LD2801113096 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1034 GMT 28 Jan 96

[FBIS Translated Text] Podgorica, 28 Jan (TANJUG)—The Serbian Radical Party-Vojislav Seselj has been founded in Montenegro by radicals who were stripped of their deputy mandates by the Montenegrin assembly at a session last December [1995].

According to a statement issued by the party today, Acim Visnjic was elected the party's chairman. The vice chairmen are Ilija Darmanovic, Drago Bakrac, and Aleksandar Stamatovic, while Milinko Gazdic was elected secretary general.

The party's program and statute were also adopted at the founding session and it was announced that the party would take part in the forthcoming elections in Montenegro.

BULK RATE
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